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Canad~
Jean-Paul Same. in his CritjQye of Pialcs;rjc;a! Reason' ynhune I _ Theory of
Prncrjcal EnSfOlbles, SClS Out to determine the significance of history for hwnan action. Sanre
commences his inquiry by investigating an abstract individual satisfying her original need in
nature and proceeds to anaiysc the concrete social fOmBtion of whicb the individual finds
bcr.idfa pan. The tools which Sartre O11'loys for his analysis include both existentialism and
the hisloricaJ materialism of Marx and Engels.
Sartres rrodificd Marxism. as exemplified in the CJ::il..iilw:. seems to correct the notion
of freedom wbicb he annbuted to individuals in his earlier work, Being and NorhjngDcss.
According to the Ialer Same. historical circumstances do have a direct bearing on what the
individual will be. or more specifically. whal choices the individual will make. Consequently.
the individuals's task. according to the Sumofthe~. is to look baek upon history and
determine both when it has been an impediment to freedom and whcn it has been conducive
tofrecdom
A:i we shall see. ooe oflhe keys to understanding Sartre's modified Marxism is his usc
ofthc expressioo.. 'pr.Ictico-inen'. This expression is a modification of the being-in-itselffrom
Being and NOIhjngnrsS. The being-in-itselfis inert in the sense that it is dependent upon tbe
beiog-for-ilselffor its meaning - without the being.for-itselftbe being-in.itselfsimply 'is'. [n
the~, the practico-inen is not dependent upon a subject to bestow meaning on it.
Rather. because it is the result of the pasl actions of hwnans. it is already cndowed with
meaning. As we will shall see. Same maintains that history demoostrates that for the most
pan we: are unfree.. as our choices are dictated to us by the forces ofthc practico-inert. But.
according to Sartrc. specific historical situations can arise which perpetuate the formation of
what he tenns fused groups. Fused groups consist of individuals who seek 10 overturn the
forces of the practico-ioert and as a result seek to see themselves in a more humane way.
Further. a fused group has the possibility of evolving into a pledged group. a group whose
members pledge themselves towards freedom.
As we sba..lI see. Sames analysis oftbe resurrection of freedom in the~ hinges
on the experience of the fear of death. It is not until death IiteraUy threatens tbe well-being
of individuals that frttdom can be achieved. as the fear of death coltl'Cls individuals into a
new way of looking both at the forees of the praetico-inen and themselves. The conclusion
reaehed in this thesis is that it is the fear ofdeath whieh distinguishes Same's Marxism
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Introduction
F.A. Hayek. in The Coosritlltjoo pf! jbeny, explains that we cannot Mfullyappreciate
the value of freedom until we know how a society of free men as a whole differs from one in
which unfrccdom prevailsM(CL 6). Because freedom is defined as 'the absence of coercion',
Hayek explains that Mour definition of Iibeny depends upon the meaning ofthe concept of
coercion. and it will not be precise until we have similarly defined that termMeCL 20).\ A
definition of freedom 'will not be precise' until we know what it is to be unfree. According
to Hayek:
coercion occurs when one man's actions are made to serve another man's will.
not for his own but for the other's purpose. It is not that tbe coerced does not
choose at all; if that were the case we would not speak of his ~aetingM.
Coercion implies ... tbat I still choose but that my mind is made someone
else's too~ because the alternatives beforc me have been so manipulated that
the conduct that the coercer wants me to choose becomes for me the least
painful onc. Although coerced. it is still! who decide which is the least cvil
under the circulTL'Hances (CL 133).
As we can sec from Hayek's definition, coercion does nOt entail that the individual docs DOt
have the power to act or the powcr to choose. Rather. coercion implies that our actions or
choices will take place within specific boundaries which havc been manipulated by another.
Coercion is inherently wrong because it eliminates the individual as a ~thinking and valuing
person- and instead renders the individual as a tool to be used for Ihe ends of another (CL
21).
Hayek claims that coercion is 'unfreedom'. as it enslaves the individual to the will of
I Incidentally. Hayek maintains that the terrm 'freedom' and 'Iibcny' are synonymous
and therefore interchangeable.
anotbo-. Freedom pertains to the condition ofiDdMduals in which coercion of some by others
is reduced as nwch as possible (CL 21 ). Hayek explains that coercion -eannot be altogether
avoided because the oW)' way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion- feL 21). We can see
that for freedom to prevail on Hayek's view. il wiU be necessary for individuals to submit to
some form of restraint. Restraint wiU be necessary. as it wiU minimize the conditions under
which coercion occurs. But any fonn of restraint will be publicly known. and therefore. an
individual need never be coerced. unless she willingly places herself in a position where she
knows she wiU be coerced:
provided lhat I know beforehand that ifl place myself in a panicular position.
I shaJ.I be coerced and provided that I avoid pUtting myself in such a positioo.
I need Dcver be coerced. At least insofar as the rules providing for coercion
are oot aimed at me personaUy but are so framed as to apply to all people
equally in similar circumstances (.a. 142).
With tn:edomcomes the notion ofrespoosibility. as the individual -wiU bear tbe consequences
ofhis actions and will receive praise or blame for tbern· (U 71). The individual must act in
a way which is conducive to freedom. If she acts in a way which is unfree. she must be
prepared to accept punishment for her actions.
At a first glance. F.A. Hayek and Jean·Paul Same make strange panners. Although
freedom is centnJ to tbe thought of both ~. Hayek's conservative libcnarianism and
Same's radical position on freedom seem [0 be incompatible. Yet on a theoretical level there
is not l1'lICb difference between Sartre's cooc:eption of freedom in the~ and Hayek's.
Samc. like Hayek. maintains that in order to be free we must know both what it is to be
unfree and why unfreedom is wrong. FreedolTL as recognized by Sanre. also implies the
absence of coercion. In Sanre's terminology within tbe~. freedom is the absence of
coercion from !he pncri:o.inen: and the ~ives which it irr(Joses upon us. According to
Same. coercion weakens a crucial component of the individual - it takes away from the
pos.~ibililies of what the indivjdual will be in tbe future. Funber.tbe freedom which Sartre
envisages also entails sorre fonn ofresu-allll upon tbe individuars actions. BUI as we shall see.
what diffcrentiar:es Sam-e's conception of freedom. from both his earlier conception in Jkini
and Nothingness and Hayek's. is that Same. in the~, explains freedom not on a
theoretical level but rather ill ~ght ofmlleriaL historical circumstances.
The aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of Jean-Paul Same's coDcqltion of
freedom. as found in his Critjqns of Dialectical Reason' YQ1!1ITC I D,,;ory of Practical
~ Wnhin the CI:iliQlK: I trace the tbought ofSann: up until The SlaMory Group of
'Book U: From Groups to History'. I Slap at this point l:Jecause it is the 'pledged group' which
Sartre claims to be "the origin of hwnanity" (.cQ& 4361. As we shall sec. the 'origin of
humanity' corresponds with the resurrection or 1Tcedom.
In chapter one ofthis thesis I first give a briefskelch oftlle 'power ofcircumstanccs'
which leads to Sartn:'s remodificalion of his 'existentiar freedom, as found in~
~. Next I provide an outline oftbe metbodology which Sartn: seeks to ~Ioy in
the~ Same's methodology. incotporating primarily tbe tbought of Hegel Mane: and
Engels. secIcs to address the questions: How have individuals made history? And how in turo
has history made individuals?
In chapter two I outline Sanre's analysis of our rail into the practico·inen world.
Same: maintains that in a world of 'scarcity' we are all subservient to the practico-inen and
its imperatives. Wilhin the practico-inert world we find our future actions conditioned. as we
take cues from Ihe matter which we interact with. In this chapler I show how Same
reforTTIJlatcs the Hegelian conception ofmaster and slave. as ODC where both master and slave
arc guilty of attending to the 'necessities' of the practice-inert. As we shall see. this
refonnulation ofHcgel's conception ofmaster and slave is a result of Same reworking Marx's
notion of fetishism
In chapter three I examine two ofSartre's conceptions ofsocial groupings. namely,
the 'scries' and the 'group'. The series is a social outgrowth of individuals who derive their
destiny from the practico-inert. Although the series has an appearance of unity. this
appearance is only such, as its members are not organised in light of any specific goal. The
rncrriJcrs oftbe group. on the other hand. are organised in light of a specific goal. namely. to
escape from their unfree serial mode of being and attain freedom
In chapter four I concentrate on the specific role that Same attributes to the fear of
death and how it motivates individuals towards free common praxis. I conclude with an
assessment of why Sanre, unlike Marx. attaches so much importance to the 'fear of death'.
Chapter One
Freedom and the Power of Circumstances
1.1 Introduction
Freedom is always at the hean ofboth Same's literary and philosophical discussions.
the Critjqye of Dialccljcal Reason being no exception. In 1945 in Being and Nothjngness
Sanre had stated: "I apprehend myself as totally free and as not being able to derive the
meaning of my world except as coming from myself' (..Bl'S 78). By 1972 this position had
changed somewhat. as in an interview from this year Sanre explains:
there are things I approve and others I look upon with shame. Among the
latter -- and lye already gone on record on this point -- is what I wrote in
1945 or thereabouts to the effect that. no matter what the situation might be.
one is always free.... There's no question that there is some basic change in
the concept offrecdom. I still remain faithful to the notion offrccdom but I
can see what can modify its results in any given situation (Shb 58).
The reason for this change in position is the result ofwhat Same terms "taforce des choses--
the power ofcircumstances" (.B..EM 33). Same admits that "L "Etre et Le Nean! itsclfshould
have been the beginning of a discovery of this power of circumstances. since I had already
been made a soldicr, when I had not wanted to be one" (.IlliM 33). Funher, Sanre adds that
"after the war came the true experience, that of society" (aEM 34). In the~ Sanre
recognizes that society bears a great influence upon the choices that an individual makes. The
task in the~ is to detennine both how the circumstances of society are capable of
coercing individuals into making cel1aiD decisions and how such coercion can be avoided.
1.2 Freedom in Being and Nothingness
Freedom in Be;n(\' and Nothjngness is defined as "the very being ofthe For-itsclfwhieh
is 'condemned to be free' and must forever choose itself -- i.e., make itself' (ms. 803). This
notion of freedom is associated with the 'death ofGod'. The advcnt of God's death signifies
the death ofeverything which we have held to be nonnative and objective. From tbis foUows
the notion that bccau!>C we no longer havc any immutable source for appeal. wc (the being-
for-ilsclf) are therefore the masters ofour own destiny, as we are nothing else save that which
we make ofourselves -- "man is free. man isjreedom. ... We are left alone, without excuse.
That is what I nx:an when I say that man IS condemned to be free" ('EH' 353).
A perwn's bcing-for-itselfis never a fixed entity; it is. rather, a combination of both
facticiry and possibility. Facticity relates to the brute facts of our lives such as our past and
only influences the future in so much as we allow it. Same claim<; that "the For-itself is
present to being in the foTtnofflight; the Prescnt is a perpcrual flight in tbe face of being" (~
179). Because existence involves self-construction. we are never finished. as we are always
fleeing both the past and prescnt and moving towards tbe possibilities ofthe future or not-yet.
Because existence precedes essencc. in tbe future we will be nothing elsc. except tbat which
we decide to make of our self Here it is crucial to note that our flight towards the future is
an attempt to achieve unity. but it is an attempt that will always fail, as we are our future in
the constant perspective ofthe possibility of not being it: NThe Future is not. it is possibilized-
Hili 186).
Sartre's philosophy as found in Bejng and Nothingness prescnts what can be termed
a radical view of freedom It is radical in the sense that it is meant to be applicab'e carte
hlanche - 00 mamr what tbe situation may be the individual as descnbed by Same. is free
to move beyond her circumslances and make herself inlo whatever she so desires. Witbin
Bejng and NOIbjngncss neither anytbing intemal nor external can interfere with our actions.
as our actions an: entirely 'up 10 us: Sartre recognizes only two hindrances to freedom First.
he claims that -no lirrits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself or. iryou prefer.
that wc are not !Tee to cease being tree~. as:
no factual state whatever it may be (tbe political and economic structure of
society. Ibe psychological "state.- etc.) is capable by itselfof motivating any
act whatsoever. For an act is a projection of the for-itselflOward what is nOI.
and what is can in 00 way determine by itselrwhat is oOt (.mf 562).
And second. -the olber's existence brings about a factual limit 10 my freedom- (.mf 611). It
is the secood limitatioo in IighI ofSarttts rerrodificatioo ofthe first which takes on a grander
scale in his philosophy withinthe~.
In Bejng and Nmbjngness Same maintains Ihal the other's existence brings a factual
limil to my freedom as -my Self exisls outside as ao object for olhers" (~ 800). Same
exemplifies bis conception of being.for-others with the example orlhe 'peeping Tom'. For
some reason or anolher - jealousy. curiosity or vice _ Sartre hypolhesizes that we have
decided 10 look through a keyhole and:
aU of a sudden I bear foot!>1epS ill tbe haU. Someone is looking at me! Whal
does this mean? It rreans that I am suddenly affected in my being and tbat the
essential modificalions appear in my struCture (Illi 349).
In such an instance. Same maintains that we bave two optioos. Either we can attempl to sec
ourselves as an object for the Other. or we can assen our subjectivity and render the other an
object. BOlh of these projects will inevitably fail. Why? Because "while I attempt to free
mysclffrom the hold ofthe Other. the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seck
to enslave the Other. the Other seeks to enslave me" (!lli. 475). "Conflict", according to
Same, "is the original meaning ofbcing-for-otbers" (IDS: 475),
Sanre's analysis of Ihe 'peeping Tom', or more specifically 'The Look', serves to
exemplify how we come to know others in the world. Same observes:
I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn and along the edges of that
lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see this man: I
apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man. What does tbis
signify? What do I mean when I assert that this object is a man? (!lli. 341).
According to Same, when we assert thai 'this object is a man', we recognize that our
perception of 'man' is fundamentally different than our perception of other objccts in the
world sueh as pm benches (c.:.ws 160). We apprehend 'man' as both an 'object' and a 'man',
because we recognize tbat 'be' sees what 'we' sec. He is a subject like us. This recognition
entails the realization that we, the subject, understand that while we see him as an objcct. be
also sees us as an object. As a result. we understand that we can only become an object
through the eyes of an other.
The subject in Being and Nothingness finds herself involved in a world of bitter
struggle unto death; Sanre fails to provide an explanation or basis for the origin of this
conflict: why do we continually attempt to objectify the other? A reason for this lack of
explanation is, as Sanre himself admits, that "the people in BN lack a foundation" ('UPS'
237). This lack ofa foundation coincides with Same's failure in Bcing and Nothingness 10
ground the individual in any realm besides that of interior experience. Such a myopic view
results in a failure to explain how the individual interiorizes her exterior experiences. or, in
otber words. bow anything external may influence our Internal decisions. Sanre bimself
eventuaUy recognized this problem. as he observed that
the individual interiorizes his social detenninations: he interiorizes the
relations of production. the family of his childhood. Ibe historical past. Ihe
colltCfTlKlrary institutions. and then be re-exteriorizes these in acts which
ocecssanly refer us bade to them (BEM 35).
The CrjrjQuc o(pja!tetical Reason is Sanre'S anefl1)t 10 determine bow botb our historical
and social settings intIucnce our view ofreality. The basis for lhis view explains why and bow
connicts between others arise.
1.3 Frftdom in tbe CritjqN' p[Dj,!crtjgl Kuson
In the Critjg!U: of pjah:etic:al 8«590' Volume I Theory of Practical Eosembles
Sanre still wishes 10 claim that humans are free in the sense tbal they are active subjects. But.
by supplying a foundation for hwnan acts. Same desires 10 show that we arc active products
of the social situation in which we find our!>elves existing.
One crucial aspect of tbe sociallhistoricaJ foundation that Same provides in the
~ istbe nocioo that !heolher is seen asa source ofmy freedom. not a bindrance to it.
Same. as we shall see in more detail in the next chapters. claims tbat it is because we dwell
in a world of 'scarcity' - "the contingent ~ssibility of satisfying aU the needs of an
ensemble~ (CUB. 829) .~ that the otber becomes a threat to my freedom Scarcity is the
foundation for our objectification of others which Sartre failed to provide in &in&....and
~. In order to avoid putting the cart before the 00£2, at this point it is sufficiou
to note that it is.scurity which seeps into the being ofcveryooc aod affects their outlook on
reality. The goal wlUch Sartre presentS in the CIitiQ.w: is to OVBCOme the inhumane relations
which scarcity perpetuates. as when this is accomplished. we will not see others as 'Others'.
but rather as humans.
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1.4 Sartre's Project in the~
As dense and obscure as the Critjque; ofpjalcctjcal Reason may appear to be, it bas
a simple project, namely. to examine the Marxian inspired claim that "men make history
precisely to the extent that it makes them" (CDR 97). Same maintains that to accomplish
such a task. a union between existentialism and Marxism is necessary. as Ihis union will
scrutinize the praxis of humans througbout history -- it will put tbe individual back into
history. something that Marxists have failed to do. Existentialism provides the "concrete
approach to reality" while Marx's historical materialism furnishes the "interpretation of
history" (SfM 2\).
Praxis as defined in the Criligw: is "the activity ofan individual or group in organising
conditions in the light of some end" (02& 829). Praxis is the actions of individuals tbat
combine to make-up our reality. Praxis. or what Same also terms 'project'. is similar to
freedom in Being and Nothingness, as it corresponds to our activities in the light oftbe future
or DOt-yet. But the one crucial difference between the two is that praxis corresponds to our
activities within a world where we are involved with others and matter.
In Search for a Method, the companion piece to the original French edition of the
CJ:iliw1c;, Sartre states:
man defines himself by his project. ... Man is. for himself and others. a
signifying being. since one can never understand the slightest of his gestures
without going beyond the pure present and explaining it by the future.
Furthermore. he is a creator of signs to the degree that -- always ahead of
bimself -- he employs certain objects to designate other absent or future
objects (SfM 152).
II
The notion of tbe human as a subject who is never a perfect unity but is involved in a
perpetUal flight towards a unity is ofcrucial irrporuocc i:t the~ as Same wiU rmintain
that history. like the individuaL is never a coft1)leted pf"OC1:SS. but rather an open-ended ooc.
The reasoning here is s~le: it is humans who make history. as we are active panicipants
within our history. Without humans there is no history. Further. because we are active
panicipanls, we can reflect on how we have historicaUy arrived at where we arc. Within lhe
~ we are still masters ofOW" deslioy. but we m.1St lim answer to history and dete:mine
how we bave made it. and bow in turn it bas made us.
I.S Sann's Structural Anlbropology
In the preface to Search fQr a Method Same poses [he following question: "Do wc
have the means 10 constiwte a structUral historical anthropology?" (SfM xxxv). Same's reply
is Ihat yes we do. if we accepl that "if such a thing as a Truth can exist in anthropology, it
must be a truth Ihal has become. and it must make ilselfa totalization" (SfM xxxv).
A totalisation. as defined by Sanre, is "tbe constantly developing (en coun) process of
uoderstanding and making history" <CI2& 830). Sanre nserts that Marx recognized and
realized tbe validity of such a claim: Marx showed in opposition to Hegclthal history is in
development and funher "he preserved the diaJectical movement both in Being and in
knowledge" (.c.:o.& 23). Manes conception of history:
shows that history does nOt end by being resolved into "self-consciousness"
as "spirit of the spirit". but that in it at each stage lhere is found a malenal
result: a sum of productive forces. an historically created relation of
12
individuals to nature and to one another ... It shows that circumstances make
men just as much as men make circumstances (Q159).
Marx, according to Sanre. recognized tbat we as individuals are not only continually
transfonning oun;clvcs (our Being). but we are also continually transfonning our reality (our
circwnstanccs). Or in other words. we progressively produce the conditions of our lives and
because we are constantly producing these conditions. we can never attain complete
knowledge: we change our reality which in tum implies changes to the conception of
ourselvcs.
In the Cr:iti.Q.u.e: thc dialcctic is defined as "the intelligibility ofpraxis at every level"
<.CJ2& 828). Sartre maintains that the followers of Marx failed to establish the nature of
dialectical truth, as they failed 10 recognize that thought is both Being and knowledge of
Being. According to Sartrc. "the dialectic is founded in existence. is concerned with existence.
and renders existence comprehensible~ (S&M ix). Sanre claims that for any structural
anthropology to be successful. Marxism must be first freed from its idealism and further, the
dialectic must be restored to everyday existcnce.
Idealism purports to explain the dialectic as a process which is divorccd from the
actions ofhumans. The problem with tbis formulation is that any knowledge of the dialectic
is presumed to derive from a dialectic that is static and unchanging. As we shall see, Sartrc
desires to explain history as a totalisation. Because history is a totalisatioD wc can never reach
an end point where we possess cOlT(.lletc knowledge. History docs not CO~ to a halt, because
as long as there arc individuals. history is in process. Accordingly. Sanre claims that idealism
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denies the possibility that dialectical knowledge is itself something that is continually
developing. Sartre maintains that Marxism has erred by accepting the Hegelian claim tbat
Absolute knowledge ean be attained and in the process has prioritized knowledge over being.
Because Hegel explains history in terms of the unfolding of the spirit or the Absolute. he
maintains that history reaches a point where the spirit unfolds eomplctcly and as a result.
absolute knowledge can be attained. Same notes that the strength of Hegel's dogmatism
rcsides in its idealisnr:
for Hegel, the dialectic had no need to prove itself. In the first plaee Hegel
took hirrnelfto be at the beginning oftbe end of History, that is to say, at the
moment where truth is death (.cDR 21).
According to Sartre. Marx and Engels demonstrate that 'truth' is not dead. but rather is in
process. In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels, in opposition to idealism, explain:
we set out from real. active IreD. and on the basis of their real life process we
demonstrate the development of their ideological reflexes and the echoes of
this life-process.... men, developing their material production and their
material intercourse, alter, along with this real existence. their thinking and the
products of their thinking (Gl47).
Marx and his followers, by recognizing that we are not at the end of history. as "History is
in development" and "that Being is irreducible to A?IOWledge". cast doubt on Hegel's notion;
yet Same claims that those like Engels who have attempted to explain the dialcctic as existing
in nature have committed an error similar to Hegel's.
2 It should be noted that when SarIre labels Hegel an idealist, he is doing
traditional sense. Richard Bcrnstein in 'Praxis: Marx and thc Hegclian Background' from
Praxis And Action puts forth a convincing argwncnt that Hegel is not an 'idealist' in the
traditional sense.
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The beliefthaI a dialeaic exists in nature stems from Engels' claim tbat we exist within
a nalUral history and therefore our human history is ~Iy one panicular aspect which
panakes in me uni\lf!rsolnatural hislol)'. Natural history intends to explain nature as being tbe
cause of everything. Humans therefore are only a particular pan of the whole of nature.
Because: this is so. the best way that humans can attain knowledge oftbemselves and of nature
is through scieotific:: laws that anetJ1)t 10 explaiD or mirror the laws OfnatUfe. Consequently.
we can arrive at an undemanding oftbe world as nature unfolds before us. What results is
a conception which maintains that knowledge is derived from nature. it is something that is
external to the praxis ofbwmns. and therefore. external to the dialectical activities of humans
themselves. The result of this view is that:
there is no longer knowledge in the strict sense ofthe term; Being no longer
manifests itself in any way whatsoever: it merely evolves according to its
own laWs. The dialectic of Nature is Natur'e without men. There is therefore
no more need for ccnainry. for criteria: even the ancropt to criticise and
establish knowledge becomes useless <.cD.B. 26).
In such a scenario. nature is given priority over humans and by the same token !.:now/edge is
given priority over Being. Humans are DO longer active panicipanu within history. but rather
they are reduced to passive panicipams witbin nalure. Sanre claim that tbere is 8 00 longer
any knowledge in the strict sense W because knowledge. abiding by a naturalistic view. is
subservient 10 nature. Such a claim Ill(I)W'\{S to the ootion tbat tbepraxiJ: ofhwnans does Dot
affect the outcome ofeveDts. as humans are simply ODe pan of nature. evolving with [be
whole of nature. Accordingly. the dialectic is not the "the intelligibility ofpraxis at every
levelW • but it is nl1ber the intelligibility ofnature. But for Same there is a paradox here - how
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does a dialectic that is discovered in tbe ·sociaJ world· end up in the natural world? The
reason is simple. according to Same: it is "foisted" upon it. not deduced from it. Fittingly.
Sanrc concludes that "the only dialectic that ODe will find in nature is a dialeaic that one has
put there oneself' «JlB, 31). Hm the assumption behind Same's argument is that the social
and the natural worlds are radically different in tbe sense that we do oot create the natural
world but wc do creatc the social world. As a result. Sartre maintains that praxis is not
reflected in nature. hut it is reflected in the social body.
In Tbf; Ecgnomjc and Pbilo'jOnhjq! Man"'igints gf J&44, Marx Slates:
in creating a world of objects by his practical activity. in his wort upon
inorganic naturc. man proves bimself a conscious being. i.e.• as a being that
treats itselfas a species being.... mao reproduces the whole of nature (ffM
1131.
This claim of Marx's is of crucial importance for Sanre. as it is representative of the gist of
Sanrcs central claims inthe~. Marx recognized the notion tbat humans arc dynamic
entities.. but his followers failed to recognize the implications of such a claim. One of the
major implications that bas been overlooked is the notion that we. as conscious beings. are
free [0 negate our environment and because we negate our environment. we recognize that
we ()t.Ine!ves are not our environmeot. Funber. our negation ofour environment corresponds
to how we are free to "work upon" or change our environment. Sanre states:
freedom implies therefore the eltistence of an environment to be changed:
obstacles to be cleared. tools to be used. Ofcourse it is ~dom which reveals
them as obstacles.. but by its free choice it can ooly interpret the meaning of
their being <.Wi 650).
We bestow meaning upon our world; the world does DOt 00 its own bestow meaning upon
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us. In the~. this claim can be re·stated to read that praxis is divorced from our
enVironrrx:nt (narurc) in the sense that the envirorunem has no command 00 its own over us.
but we can command it.
Sanre does not deny outright the possibility of a dialectic in nature -- he just thinks
it is impossible to prove. The task. according to Same, is not to engage in a I1lCtaphysical
debate concerning the possibility of a dialectic in nature. but rather to establish the "limits"
and "scope" of"dialectical certainty". The "limits" and "scope" of "dialectical certainty" will
pertain to our social environment, as this is the environment which we create out of nature.
And because it is our envirof\lTlCot, we must acknowledge tbat:
ifthcre is such a thing as a dialectical reason. it is revealed and established in
and through human praxis. to men in a given society at a particular moment
of its development (CDR 33).
Here: we have the first fOnTUllation ofSanrcs structural anthropology, as the praxis of human
existence can reveal to us the societal structures which we have historically created.
1.6 History in Development
After having established the abstract groundwork for the existence of a dialectic,
Sartrc proceeds to claim that the basic intelligibility of dialectical reason. if it exists. is that of
a totalisation. As previously nx:ntioned. a totalisation is "the constantly developing process
of understanding and making history" (CllR 830). Sanre notes that it is important not to
confuse totalisations with totalities.
A totality is a being which "while radically distinct from the sum of its parts, is present
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in its entirety. in one fonn or aootbcr. in each ofthese partsR<CDR 45). Totalities are entities
that havc an appearance ofclosure. This sense of closure is due to the fact that totalitics are
the errilodimem ofpast praxis. Tota~ties are what Sanre in tbe~ will eventually tcnn
pructicQ-inen: R rmner in which past praxis is embodiedR (CJlB. 829). Examples of totalities
are: creative works. machines. tools. consumer goods. erc (CQ.& 45). Totalities art: inert in
the sense that tbey are created out of maner. but the fact that they are 'created' cntails that
tbey have an aClivtty ofthcir own - they communicate their possible prescnt and future use.
A totatisation bas a similar struaure to a totality. in that each part is an expression of
[he whoe and Rrelates the whole to itselftbrougb the mediation of its panSR (CDR 46). But
the one crucial difference be:tweeo tbe two is tbat a totalisatioo is a Rdet'f!loping activity". A
tota1isation is nevercomplae, but rather i." continually building upon the sum of its pans. But,
just because a totalisat:ion is in a continual Stale ofdevelopment does nOl mean that we eannnt
possess knowledge ofit. Rather. we can attain knowledge of bow every pan is momentarily
connected with the others within tbe movement'.
The Dotion that any knowledge ofthe dialectic derives from a totalisation coincides
with Sanre's attempt 10 demonstrate how the individual is inenricably linked to histolY.
Sanre maintains that reflexively we can grasp the notion of dialectical bonds that render
intelligible to us hwnaD developmcm as a whole. Reflexivity penans to the notion that we can
compreheod tbat we are cuhural agents. We are agents who are related to both past and
present histolY. Sanre notes:
as soon as I reflexively grasp this bond of interiority which links me to tbe
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cultural totalisation. I disappear as a cultivated individual and emerge as the
synthetic bond between everyone and what might be called lbe culntralfield.
... I find myself dialectically conditioned by the totalised and totalisiog pans
of tbc process ofbuman developmem : as a 'cultured' man (an cxpression
which applies to every man. whalever his euhure. and even ifhe is illiterate)
Itotal.ise myselfon the basis ofceoturies of history and. in accordance with
my culture, I tOtalise this c:tperience (mB. 54).
The diaJec1ic is a human activity which renders us cooscious ofbow all our separate individual
acts combine to produce our social reality. Sartre maintains that human actions can only be
understood in terms oftotalisations. as they art: how we understand both our past and present
actions. Here it is ~nant to note tbat tbe individual who reflects upon her situation does
not take a privileged position outside of the domain of dialectical activity. Rather. she:
discovers tbal she is an individual who is curreDtIy participating in the process of history and
this is an open-ended process.
1.1 The Plan for tbe Rw: of tbe Cl:iIiQ.uI:
Sartre's plan for the rest ofthe Cl::itU is to examine individualpraris and investigate
bow it leads to various fonns ofburrBD enscnDles. Bycomnencing with the individual Sanre
does not desire to retum to the indMdual from Bejng and Nmhjn2ncss who is condemned to
be free. Rather. Sartrc. by using the individual as his starting point. wishes to show how the
individual'spnuLr when taken in the eontext of the societal totalisation she exists in. can
revea.l how tbe humao ensembles of which she is pan. eitber create or binder her freedom.
Sanre terms the method that he wiU employ the progressive-regressive method. This
method is exel11'1ified ill Sean;b for a MC'!.bod bySanre's example ofan individual who opens
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a window in a room. Sanrt observes:
if my companion suddenly starts lowards the window. I understand his
gestures in terms of the material situalion in which we both are. It is. for
~Ie, because the room is too wann He is going -(0 let in some air". This
action is oot inscribed in the temperature; it is nOI -set in motion" by the
warmth as by -S1inR1lus- provoking chain reactions. There is present here a
synlhetic conduct, which. by unifying itself. unifies before my eyes the
practical field in which we both are(SEM 153).
Here on a progressive level we can view the individual's action of opening the window in
tenns ofher going beyond tbe too warm present in order to cool the room in tbe fulure. On
a regressive level we can undemand tbat the window was opened because in the past it was
too hot. But the situation in tbe apanment room is more complex than the simple act of
opening a window. Sartre claims that "within the room. doors and windows are never entirely
passive realities: the work of other people bas given them their meaning ... But my
companion's movement makes explicit the crystallised indicalions and designations in these
products ... His conduct unifies tbe room. and lhe room defines his conduct- (SfM 154). The
practical field, the apartment room. is itself a totalisation. as it is DOl only representative of
Ihe owner's SOCi<recollOmc standing. but the room itself has become a room through Ihe
historical actions ofbumans who bave through praxis created apartment rooms. The various
totalities whicb combine to make the apanment room an 'apartment room' aetuaUy
circumscnbe certain actions 10 Ibe individual within tbe room
The example of the apanrnent room is analogous [0 Same's larger project in the
~. Inthe~. by etrqlloying the progressive/regressive method. Sanre begins witb
a phenomenological description nfthings on tbe generaJ level This is the progressive stage
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and it is used to reveal the essentlal structures ofbuman reality ('SPH' 238). The regressive
stagc moves from the facts of reality to the conditions of their possibility ('SPH' 238). This
stage seeks to determine wbat makes reality what it is. The overall goal of the CI::il.iQ.ue is to
progressively/regressively trace the actions of humans within the material field in order to
detcnninc how we have structured our field as we have. By staning with praxis. Same seeks
to demonstrate how "man makes history" by investigating the structures which bumans create
via their praxis. By progressing regressively the goal of the~ is "to reveal and establish
dialectical rationality. that is to say, the complex play ofpraxis and totalisation" (CDR 39).
For Same the "complex play ofpraxis aDd totalisation" means that we are all active
panicipants within our social milieu. Funher, we arc all linked to history. as evcn in the
prescnt we arc making history, as we arc moving towards the futurc. The goal of the first half
ofthc~ is to proceed by means of the progressive/regressive rrethod in order to view
how we have situated our environment as we have. Same maintains that we can stan with
the individual -- any individual -- because all individuals are active panicipants in history.
1.8 Conclusion
The intent of this chaptcr was 10 give a brief exposition of the 'power of
circumstances' which led to Sanre's rethinking of frecdom. as presented in .1kini.....and
~ and to introduce the reader to the methodology which Sartre seeks to employ.
Inthe~, Same rmintains that individuals are free in the sense that they are continually
projecting themselves towards the fulUre. But the individual's future is influenced by her
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circumstances. In order to understand bow circumstances influence individuals. Sartre
incorpomes the materialism ofMarx and Engels intO his existential theory. As we saw in this
cbaplcr. Sanre explains that any undem.andiog ofettumslanc:es rmst remain within the realm
ofhwnan expericoce. The basis for such a claim is Same's be6eftbat it is hwnans who create
circwmtances. But as we shall see. tbese circumstances are created on tbe basis of prior
conditions.
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Chapter Two
The faU into the Practico-Inert World:
Reification and Alienation
2.1 Introduction
In The Gcumn Ideology Marx and Engels observe that "we must begin by stating the
tim premise of all ofhuman existence and. therefore. all of history. the premise namely that
men must be in a position in order to be able to 'make history·' (ill 48). In order to see how
humans make history Marx and Engels claim that we must recognize three conditions of
social development. First:
life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing
and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the
means to satisfy these needs. tbe production of material life itself. And indeed
this is a historical act. a fundamental condition of all ofhistory, which today,
as thousands of years ago. must daily and hourly be fulfiUcd merely in order
to sustain human life (m 48).
The first 'hi.!o10rical act' corresponds to our original needs in nature, as in order to survive we
recognize that we must go to nature to satisfy these needs. And as soon as we satisfy these
needs we set in motion our 'material life'. Second. "the satisfaction of the first need (the
action ofsatisfying, and the instrument of satisfaction which bas been acquired) leads to new
needs" (Q148). Upon satisfaction ofour original needs. we do not remain content, but rather
we create new needs and new means to satisfY these necds courtesy of our productive
activity. And third. Marx and Engels note that "men. who daily remake their own life, begin
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to make otber men. [0 propagate their own kind" em 48). When we rcma.ke our life we
remake ourselves. as we change our material circumstanCeS. And because we do so in a social
Context. we also lay the foundation for tbe future material reality oforhers:
as individuals exp~ their life. so they ilre. What tbey are. therefore.
coincides with their production. both with whm they produce and with how
they producc. The nature of individuals thus depends on tbe material
conditions determining their productioo (Q142).
Marx's and Engels' three conditions ofsocial developmeDt cormine to affirm that throughout
history we produce our material reality. A<Xording to Marx and Engels. because we are
productive anim1Is. we produce our material conditioas which in tum produce our historical
reality.
Sartre is in complete agreement with Marx's and Engels' tnree conditions. as he
himself states: "My formalism. which is inspired by that of Marx. consists simply in
recognizing that lIED rmke History prtCisely to the extent tbal it makes lhem" <a2R 97). As
we saw in the ~chap:er. Sanre's goal in the first volwne of the CJ::iI.iIuLc is to MreveaJ
and establish dialectical rationality ... the corJ1)lex play ofprw:uJ and totalisation'" (02& 39).
Same. like Marx and Engels. desires to explain history as an ongoing process which is
influenced by tbe activities ofindividuals in light of some specific end. Sartre. aloog the same
lines as Marx and Engels. desires to determine what our interaaion with mauer eao infonn
J From the glossaryoftbe CriI.iluLepraxis is defined as: "the activity ofao individual
or group in orgaoisiog conditioos in the light ofsome eod" emR 829) .
• 10 the glossary a totalisalioo is defined as tbe constantly developing (en COUTS)
process of understanding and making bistory u:Jm 830).
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us of ourselves.
Sartre maintains tbat Marxists have misinterpreted Marx's notion that M meo make
History" by explaining history as a process which produces tbe material foundations ofsociety
which in tum produce us. At the bean ofsucb an interpretation rests the beliefthat we are
solely detennined by the economic structure which we find ourselves in. Sanre states.
contrary to this view. that "it is evident that we do DOt conceive ofecnnomic conditions as
the simple static structure ofan unchangeable society" (SfM 31). (n addition Sanre notes that
"tOCay's Marxists are coocemed only with adults; reading tbem. one would believe tbat we
are born at tbe age wben we earn our first wages" (SfM 62). Economic detcrntinism is
analogous to saying tbat tbe cbildbood activities of an individual play no role in tbe sIlaping
ofthe adult or, more specifically, the praxis of individuals plays DO role in the formulation of
the material cooditioos oftbeir histexy. As Richard Bernstein explains. Nthe image cfman that
a class anirml swept aJoog:Jy a web of~nal folCeS that bave a law·like
regularity - laws tbat determine what man is and over which he bas no
control(US7).
This interpretation of Marx derives from wbat Joh.c McMurtry descnbes as being tbe most
~critica.L puzzled and celebrativeM doctrine of intellectua.l history, namely. Marx's alleged'
cooceptioo ofMec:ooomic determinismN(SMYlY: 157). As McMuray poinu OUI, Marx himself
ntveruscd the term 'economic determinism'. Rather, it evolved from Marx's use. in his later
works. oftenns such as economic structure: 'economic base' and economic fonn'(SMYlY
157). Bur Marx was ant using these tetmS to imply that economics was the sole determining
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factor in historical development. Rather he was using them to serve as an explanation for one
of the forms which our activities bas taken, namely. 'economics' (fA 58). Ecooomics unlO
itself is not the 'exclusive' sphere of human aaiviry. Econ"mics is a cormm.lion of various
human aciioos. Bernstein points out that:
economy. or 10 use Marx's Ienn, "political economy" is not a single. selective
dimension of human life; il is a congealed or crystallized fonn of human
aaivity - ofptTJriJ. To think ofeconomic categories as refeniog to a single.
abstract dimension of buman life is to be guilty of what Man himself called
"fetishism" (fA 58).
To see bow we make history. Same advocales we commence with the praxis oftbe
individual and progress 10 the social ensemble of which she is a pan. This is analogous 10
saying that if we want to know what makes an adult individual an adult. we stan with their
childhood and prDgTCSS to their present. Sanre states that he:
intends. withoul being unfaithful to Marxist principles. to find mediations
which allow the individual CODcrete - the panicular life. the real and dated
conflict. the petWo - to emerge from Ibe background of Ihe genl!ral
contradictions of productive forces and relations of production (SfM 57).
Sanre. as we shaD see. will go 10 great 1eogT:hs 10 show thai history is a 'social dcveloplTlC1lt'.
History is the direct result oftbe activities of individuals and because this is so. Ihc only way
10 understand history is to stan with the individual. As we sball see. Sanrc will sIan by
examining Ihe individual in nature. proceed to examine Ibe individual in relalion 10 maner
(which expresses tbeplTlXis oflbe individual). and. finally. be will conclude by examining the
individual's relatioo to the social fonnation to which she belongs. As mentioDed previously,
Sanre will stress that history, like the individual is an open.ended process - it is never
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finished. but ratbercoDSfamly develops. The specific goal ofthis second chapter is to examine
how Same rraiDiains tbat we as active panicipants in history fotmUlate OUT material reality.
By looking upon history. Same maiDtains that we caD see bow OUT reialioos with matter bave
CortE back to haunt us. as they have taken on a reality oftheir' own. We are still active agents.
but our activities are restricted. This chapter will focus 00 two related aspectS of Same's
argwnem for bow praxis becomes restricted. The first is Same's concqllioo ofscarcity and
how it botb undennines our relatioo witb maner and others. The secooo penaios to bow
socialised maner. tbe practice-inen. dictates imperatives to us.
( begin my analysis by providing an overview ofSanre's conception of negation or.
more specificalJy. lade. from Being and Nothingness. This concept is ~nant because. as
we shall see., lack correspoods with need and labour in the~. Sanre maintains tbat
negation is a fundamentaJ aspect ofbeing human. Same. by stipulating an existential structure
for the act of the hwnao agent. provides a strong foundation for Marx's claim that humans
are tbe 'conscious' producers oftbeir materia.l Life. t then examine Sanre's categories ofneed
and labour. I show how on an individual level we negate and organise OUT world. Then I
explain how Same demonstrates that we come to recognize our fellow humans through tbeir
labouring actions. I conclude by showing bow scarcity and tbe practice-incn combine to
produce an alienated world.
2.2 The Oria:in of Negation
As rremiooed in the preceding cbaptcr. one ofthe crucial compoocntS fromJkiD&,..and
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~ which Same rttaiDs in lbe CI::i1iQw: is tbe DOtion oftbe' human being as an agent
who is both constantly fleeing (he past and present and moving towards the future. Hwnan
reality. as recognized by Same. is an anempt 10 achieve a completeness that can never be
achieved. In order to extfTlIllfY Ibis conception ofbwnan reality. we wiU proceed to examine
Sanre"s notion of negation.
Negation penains 10 identity' and 'difference: or respectively. two regions of what is
specific to human being: being-in-itself and being-for-itself~ SO). As explained in Jkina:
and Nmbjnlmes!i. being·in-itself is in co~lete ideality with itself. as it lacks DOthing: '"it is a
plenitude. and strictly speaking we can say of it only that it isM (!lli 800). Being-in-itself is
neither created by God. Dor self<reated. It is sirrJ;>1y a full positivity of being which contains
no non-being (ill 12), As we shaU see. being-in-itselfdoes not change on its own. Unlike
an individual's being-for-itself. tbe being-in-itselfdoes not project itself intO tbe future.
An individual's being-for-itself is similar to the being-in-itself. as tbe latter too finds
herselfbeing in a world. But what dminguisbes being-for-itself from being-in.itself is thai lhe
former has tbis specific ability to 'discover' herself as exiSling in a world. This discovery
entails thai being-for-itseLf is 'different' from the lhings which sbe finds in her world. This
discovery ofdifference hinges on lbe nOlion that being-for-itseLfpossesses consciousness.
Experience. according to Same. is tbe point of contaCt between consciousness and
its object (beiDg-iD--itse!f). Sanre, like Husserl. claims Ibat aU consciousness is consciousness
ofsometbing and further. a reciprocity exists between consciousness and its object. An object
depends upon consciousness for its meaning and consciousness requires an object to be
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conscious of. Without consciousness. things simply 'are'.
AI this point wc can see how being-for-itselfcreates or bestows meaning upon the
things ofttle world. Originally. the work! appears to us as a fuU positivity ofbeiDg. But as we
approach it. we break up its fullness. by bestowing meaning upon what wc' ann"hute 10 be its
~nent pans. For instanCe. 'A' appean as 'A' because we tear it away from tbe fuUne:ss
oflhe world and provide it with such a meaning - we negate it. As a result. wc are able to
distinguish that 'A' is not 'B'.
Being-for-itself\ ability to recognize hots' or non-being is crucial to Sanrc's
philosopby. as he rrIlintains that MmlJI is the being through whom nothingness comes inlO the
worid" CBl:i 59). Being-for-itselfbas two Ievcls ofconsciousness; !be pre-reflective cagito and
the reflective cogito, Sanre explains tbe fact of two levels of consciousness as foUows. On
a pre-reflective level our consciousness is 'intentional'. as it is always flowing outward
towards a thing that is an object-otbeNban-coosciousness COlli 32). At lhe same time,
because we can re8ect upon our self. on our pre-refiective<ogito. we become aware that we
are different than our intended object ofconsciousness. For instance, 00 a pre-reflective level
of consciousness. when engaged in the activity ofcounting cigarenes. our intentions arc so
engrossed in the activity itself. that we have only a 'fleeting' awareoess of ourselves. But if
someone were 10 ask - "%at are you doing?" - our reply would be - -I was counting
cigarenes", At this point, we have reflected upon our actions. as we have made Ihe activity
of counting cigarenes an object of consciousness. At Ihe same time. because we have
reflected upon our activity. we have also moved beyond it. Beiog-for-itselfs reality
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corresponds with its recognition ofa gap in its structure of being. Same. borrowing from
Heidegger, explains that Rthe characteristic of selfness (SelbSlheit), in fact, is tbat man is
always separated from what he is by aU the breadth of the being which he is nol" (11M S I).
Being-for-itselfboth ls'(beingl and is ooC(oothingncss).
To be a conscious being. a being-for-itself. is to endlessly bring nothingness intO
being. Sartre rmintains tbat the principle attitude being-for-itselftaJces to the world is one of
interrogation. We exist in a world where we DOt only question such things as our ideas of the
wor1d.. but also the exIemai worid itself We ask for example, 'Is Pierre in the eafe?'. And the
reply that we expect is eitbtt 'yes'(positive) or 'oo'(oegative) - "Yes. Pierre is present in lbe
cafe" or, "No. Piette is absent from the cafe". It is imponaot to note tbat such conceptions
as absence and presence are brought into being through an individual's being-for-itself. In the
~ Sartre wiU claim that "it is through man that negation comes to man and matter"
(CD.& 83). The search for Pierre serves to ~tify bow we bring absence (DOthingnessl totO
the world:
I have an appointment with Pierre at four oclock. ( arrive at the cafe a Quaner
ofan hour late. Pierre is always punctual. Will he have waited for me'? I look
at the room.tbe patrons, and I say. "He is not here." ... It is cenain that the
cafe by itself with its patrons, its tables. its booths. its mirrors. its lights. its
srmIcy amnspbere. and the sound ofits voices. ranling SlUeen. and footsteps
which fill it - the cafe is a fullness of being.... But Pierre is oot here. This
does not mean tbat I discover his absence in some precise spot in the
estabtishment. In fact Pierre is absent from tbe whole cafe; his abseoce fixes
tbe cafe in its evanesceoce; the cafe remains ground (BN <W-42).
Just as the world prior 10 the arrival of an individual's being-for-itselfis a fullness of being,
so too is the cafe, as it is tbe ground where we 'expect' the figure of Pierre to stand out. We
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enter the cafe and stan negating it - Pierre is not at the table by the door .. or is he at the
table by the bar ... Finally, Pierre is oowbcrc to be found in the cafe. Because Pierre is absent,
his absence serves as a double event which affects the being of the cafe. First, the ground. the
cafe. is annihilated. as Pierre who was expected to be present is not. And second. the central
figure. Pierre. is a no-thing. as he refuses to exist in the cafe and as a result his nothingness
stands out from the ground of the cafe. Nothingness permeates the cafe.
Sanrc claims that of aU negations. lack is the most penetrating. as it is the very essence
of the being-for-itself. In an imponant passage in Bejng lind NOIhjngness Sanre States:
human reality is its own surpassing toward what it lacks; it surpasses itself
toward the panicular being which it would be if it were what it is. Human
rcality is not something which exists first in order afterwards to lack this or
that; it exists first as lack and io immediate synthetic connection with what it
lacks. Thus the pure event by which human reality rises as a presence in the
world is apprehended by itself as its own lack. In its coming into existence
human reality grasps itself as an incomplete being. It apprehends itself as a
being in so far as it is not. in tbe presence of the particular totality which it
lacks and which it is in the fonn ofoot being it and which it is. Human reality
is a perpetual surpassing towards a coincidence with itself which is never
given (!lli 139).
Through being-for-itselfs structure ofconsciousness we have sccn how we lack unity. as a
distance exists within consciousness itself. To exist as being-for-itselfis to be aware that we
arc not identical with anything which we come across -- including our self. But this lack of
identity means that we can reach beyond ourselves and relate all things to ourselves for our
own purposes (CJlli: 43). Hwnan reality, as recognized by Sanre, is analogous to a being that
is always lacking SOnEthing and must fill itself in the hopes ofachieving a completeness that
it will never achieve.
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2.JN'"
In tbe~ Sanre states:
everything is to be explained through need (Ie besoin/; need is tbe first
totalisiDg relation betwcco dlC material being. man. and the material ensemble
ofwhich he is pan (CD.R 80).
Need is the pure event by which human reality rises as a preseocc in tbe workL as it is our
original Lack - it is bow we first negate our reality (SM 52). Prior 10 tbe advent of need.
I'W\IR exists as a fulloess ofbeiDg; but because we exist as lacking something. we therefore
turn to nature to fiJI this lack. For instance. the individual in oature who experiences bunger
must reach beyond herself, as she lnJ,Sl interrogate the narural environment in order 10
discover what can fulfiU her need. When she discovers something that can fiU her need she
now views her environrrem in a new light. At this point the natural world is ·00 longer simply
a world ofnatural objects. Instead it is divided iota objects that can satisfy the need and tbose
that cannot- <SM 52). Further, tbe 'natural' world DOW becomes a 'materiaJ' field. as it has
received praxis - it has been negated in lenns of need.
Same states that "it is through Deed thai the first negation of the negation and the first
lota1isation appear in matter- (CQ& 80). Need is a 'oegation oflbe negalion': it is revelalory
of something which we IacIc. and lberefore Deed in order to function as a hwnan organism
Need may only be oegated by tunling to the natura! world. Need is a positivity in tbe sense
Ihal as sooo as it appears ~surroundingmailer is endowed with a passive unity, in thai a
developing totalisation is reflected in it as a tota[ity~ (COB. 81). We. the projecting beings,
are the developing totalisalion which is reflected in mailer. Because the world harbours Ihe
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possibility ofour non-being. we negate it in terms ofwhat can satisfy our needs. And because
we can pfCSCTVe ourselves through cenain things, we bestow a sense of purpose upon these
specific things. i.e.. 'A' stands out in the world as something which can satisfy hunger.
We bave seen that Same. like Marx. maintains that once we act upon need. we set
history in motion: we transform the narural world into our material field. Funher. Sanre.
again similarly to Marx. agrees that we as beings in need must go outside of ourselves to
satisfy these needs. For instance, Marx in The Economic and Philosophical Manllscripts
claims that "hunger is an acknowledged need of my body for an objcct existing outside it,
indispensable to its integration and to the expression of its essential being" (EfM 181). Same
explains that "the man ofneed is an organic totality perpetually making itself into its own tool
in the milieu ofexteriority" (COB. 82). 'The man of need' must reach into the world in order
to preserve himself. As we shall see. the fundamental difference between Same and Marx
resides in Same carrying over. from Bejng and Nothingness, his formulation of
consciousness.
As noted earlier in this section. Same explains that "need is the firSt totalising relation
between the material being. man. and the material ensemble ofwhich be is pan" (COR 80).
Sanre is led to tenn tbe human agent a material being "because everything points to the fact
that living bodies and inanimate objects are made of the saTTlC molecules" CC.I2& 81). At the
same time:
these statutes contradict one another. since one oflhem presupposes a bond
of interiority between tbe whole as a unity and molecular relations, wbereas
the otber is purely external (CDR 81).
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Althougb not explicitly stated. wbat we have bere is as close to a 'biologicalization' of tbe
hWTIUI agent as Same will allow for. Same claims that ·tbe basic behaviour associated witb
need for food reproduces the elemenwy processes of nutrition: cbewing. salivation. stomach
contractions. etc.· (.c.o& 80). Sanre explains also tbat "discbarge and excretion ".. are: just
opaque and biological foons ofoegltioo· u:D& 85). The body is descnbed as a 'fuoction'
beuuse it is specificaUy fined to process food and discharge its waste. But. according to
Same, even on a 'biological' level we never possess a cOfT1)leteness. as we destroy our food
by chewing it and then proceed to discharge it in the fonn of excrement. We discover the
body as a 'function' due to our conscious. reflective being.
In Search For a Method Sanre states:
we do not bold that this first act of becoming conscious of the situation is tbe
originating source of the actioo; we see it as a oecessary movement of the
action itself (SEM 32).
Our original existence is related to our discovery ofourselves as existing as lack. For instance.
we reflect upon ourselves and discover that because we are bungry. in order for our body to
function. we need to fill it witb food. Consequently. we interiorize the external enviroomem
in terms oftbat wbich can fulfiU our lack. This is the 'oecessary movement of action itself.
Marx states tbat "in creating a world o!objecu by his practical activity. in his work
upon inorganic nature. man proves himself a conscious species being- <.E.eM 113). Sanre is
in co~lete agreement with Marx. but be takes this notion oue step back and claims that
because the human agent consciously recognizes berselfas lack. she therefore recognizes that
she needs to create an objective. material world.
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2.4 Labour
Sante'S conception of need serves as an abstract prelude 10 Ihe discussion of labour.
as labour itselfis!be coocret:e devdopmerII ofoc:ed. labour is rmre concrete in tbe sense tbat
we literally leave behind traces ofpra.ris in tbe Ibingswhicb we creale from maner. as we
cxprl$S praxis in concrete maner. Our praxis becomes practico-men - worked incnia. As
we have seen. we are beings of action: we aet upon our original oeeds in nature and theD
proceed to CODlinually transform ourselves and in tbe process tum the Datural envirollllY:Dt
into a praeticaJ field.
Sanre notes that "man is a malerial being set in a malerial world; he wants 10 change
Ibe world whicb crushes bim· (COR 112). The bwnao agent desires '10 change the world'
because she realizes that she lacks a lucid awareness of her material world. Sbe feels
threalened by her cllvirotunenl and as a result. she desires 10 organise her surroundings by
COnstrueling tighter and tighter relations within the material field. as tbese rclations allow her
10 know her world (C!2B. 91). Sanre explains tbat:
man. wbo produces bis life in tbe unity oftbe materia.l field. is led by praxis
to define zones.. systems and privileged objects within the inen totality (CJ2&
89).
We establish 'zones: as the tbings which we introduce or organise ate a result ofpraxis in
light of some 'DeW' specific eod. namely. the project of increased efficiency in the tt\\terial
wor1d. For tnstancc, within Zone'ZO, 'A' can satisfy need 'A'. Funber within ZOne 'Z', tool
'B' may facilitate tbe satisfaction of need 'A'.
Same explains that there is a price to be paytd for crafting tighter relations within the
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worid.as:
tbe meaning of hwnan labour is tbat man is reduced to inorganic materiality
in order to act materially on matter and 10 change his maleriallife u:::.o& 178).
In uansforming the world whicb CTUSbes us.. we reduce ourselves to inorganic materiality. as
we tmSl constantly make ourselves into tools. This applies 10 both tbe individual who must
u.c;e the weight and force ofber hands in order to extract Ihings from the ground and equaUy
10 the individual who must exen weight upon a shovel. [n botb cases it is Ihe inenia oflhc
individual's body whicb is directly responsible for the transformation oflbe materia! world.
Labour in1Jlies lbat we transfer praxis untO maner. But although maner does rece1ve
prtUis. it al the same time retains its inertness. Nevenheless a peculiar tbing cx:cun when
praxis and maner are united. To fUrther iUustrate this DQtion we can hypothesise bow we
might construct a ladder in order 10 reacb things that are beyood our realm ofextension. On
one hand. the praxis inscribed in !he ladder is extension. as it allows us 10 reach new heights.
On the other band. we 0UI'Sdves becoox: an extenSion oftbe ladder. as in order for its project
10 function. we rt'IJSI clirm it Unlike us, the ladder is a static object. as it is simply a material
thing which has corne into being viapraris. Astrange phenomenon occurs when we become
an extension of the ladder. as we ourselves absorb its inertia and make ourselves a material
extension of it - we become liten.Uy an extension oflbe ladder and 'its' project.
The ladder"s project is rqJl'~wive oftbe mediation between the praaico-inen and
humans. Although worked maner is stalic in tbe sense that it is inen. it is at the same time
'dynamic', as it is tbe result of past pnuis. Sartre maintains !hat because worked matter is a
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result ofpraxis. it unavoidably conrn.micates a project - its use. As we shall see. Same
claims that the relation berweeD die pBClil;:o.ioert and bwnans becomes problematic when the
project which tbe practice-inert COltYWDicates becomes an irf1xntive - an imperative tbat
shapes our future.
2.5 The Labourer Within Society
Up until this point we bave been considering Sanre's conceptions of need and labour
primarily on an abstract and individual basis. as we bave been coocentratiIlg on the relation
bctwcal the \ndividuafand the nannVrnaterial wor1d. This is onty pari oftbe story. as Sanre
recognizes that N tO consider an individual at work is a cotllllet:e abstraction. since in reality
labour is as n'llcb a relation between men as a relation between man and the material world N
<CD.& 91). labour. for Same. is a social activity. But wbat does tbis activity tell us about
ourselves?
Sanre makes an imponant point about labour when he notes that there is no such
thing as a labourer in isolation - labourers do oot exist outside of the totalising praxis of
humans. Sante recognizes that "isolated labourers. in fact. exist wherever the social and
tecbnX:aloooditions oftheir wone require tbat tbey wone alone" <.CIl& 9S). But here we can
see that the lso1atioo'whicb the labourers experience is a direct effect of "social and teehnical
conditions" whicb are in turn a part oftbe totalising activities of individuals.
Sanre makes the point tbal tbere is no sucb tbing as a labourer in isolation in order
to strelJgtben his subsequent claim thai human relations are a direct result ofpraxis, i.e.. how
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we totalise our world (material field) plays a direct role in both how we know our self and
others. For example, Same observes:
from my window, I can see a road-mender on the road and a gardener
working in a garden. Between them there is a wall ... I ean see them without
being seen. and my position and this passive view of them at work situates me
in relation to them I am laking a holiday' (CDR 100).
From his hotel window Same explains that we can recognize two important points about the
labourers. First. the on-looker recognizes that although she does not belong to the same class
of the labourers she observes. her very understanding of this difference enables her to
comprehend that she, like the workers. exists against an "undifferentiated background
consisting of synthetic relations" (CD..R 101). By 'observing' the praxis of the workers, we
can sec that their respective actions define them in tbe world, e.g., she is a road-mender who
shovels asphalt onto the road. Sartre states that "I come to conceive myself, and in making
mysclfwbat I am I discover them as they make themselves, that is.. as their work produces
them" (CDR 101). Sanre recognizes that he. a vacationing intellectual, belongs to the same
world as the labourers., but be bas his' own specific project whicb is recognizable and which
he carries into the world. Instead of a sbove~ his tools are pens and paper.
The second point which Same observes is that "tbe reality of the Other affects me in
the depths ofmy being to the extent that it is not my reality" (CDR 101). Here Same makes
the point that while he sees his world being mended and gardened, he is not able to penetrate
the reaIityoftbe labourers without objectifying them He can only observe their praxis - how
tbey interact with the world - but he cannot reflect upon their actions in the same way that
38
he can his OWO. Sartre states:
each oftbe two men is re-conceived and located in the perpetUal field by my
act ofcomprebensioD; hut with each ofthem. through the weeding. pruning
or digging hands. or through the measuring. calculating eyes.. through the
entire body as a lived instnunent. I am robbed ofan aspect of(he rea.I (CDB.
102).
The "aspect ofthc real" which is robbed is that nobody appears simply as man' but only in the
role which their pratiJ takes with maner. We recognize tbe other by her project in the world.
As a result. -everyone recognises the Other on tbe basis of social recognition to whieh his
clothes.. his toots. etc.. passively bear witness" <.CDR 110).
As we have seeD. in order for the individual to change the material world sbe must
make herself intO a tool - she m.JSt objectify herself in tbe world. And it is through this
ol:!icctificarion that we come to know our fellow human. We know them not as a human.. but
rather through the roles their prruis (project) takes in tbe world. The objectification of each
Other is DOl a set goal but rather a consequence of every one following their own projcet in
the world.
Same explains that because: everyone: is a project in the world.. perfect reciprocity
demands the fulfilment of four conditions:
firsl:. that the Other is a means to the e'ttent that 1myself am a means. that is
to say. that the Otber is [be means ofa transcendent end and not my means;
second. that I recognise the Other as praxis. that is to say. as a developing
totalisation. at the sanE rirIE as integrating him as an object iDto my totalising
project; tbird. that I recognise his movement towards his own ends in the
same movement by which I project myself towards miDe; and founh. that I
discover myselfas an object and instrument of his ends througb the same act
which constitutes bimas an objective instrument ofmy ends (CIl& 112- t 13).
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We come to recognize the other as being both the 'same' and 'different' tban us. The other
is the same. as she. like 'me'. bas a specific prop:. wbich identifies her in the world. She is
different from 'me'. in the sense that even though her project: eDtalls an end. il: is a different
end than rrine. The reciprocal recognitioo ofothers as projects suggestS that reciprocity can
eil:her be positive or negative. We can efr:her accept the project ofthe other. or we can refuse
to recognise the Other's project. In the Ianer situation tbe refusal of recognil:ioo "is not to use
Hegel's idealist language". a suuggJe to death (CDR 112); rather. it. is the result ofa ·concrete
antagonism" which exists in tbe material world.
2.6Scanity
We bave seen through Sartres analysis of labour bow the mediation between humans
and matter suucrures our recognition ofothers in accordance with their roles. as opposed to
tbeir purely human status. But. according to Sanre. the basis of history does not penain
specifically to materiality, but rather to scarcity. As DOted in tbe previous chapter. scarcity is
defined as "the contingent impossibility of satisfYing all the needs of an ensemble" (02&
829).' With respect to the role that tbe concept ofscarcity plays in his philosophy of history,
, Such a claim. as Raymond Aron recognizes. deserves more consideration. Aron
DOtes that OOa species that 0'l.ISt labour to survive - to bunt. cook.. cultivate the soil or raise
anima.Is - is uoderthe sway ofthe law ofscarcity, scarcity oftime and space or even of non-
renewable resources. It is possible to conceive ofa society that may have triumphed over
scarcity ... But even then. it is only upon ooe coodil:ion: the voluntary. conscious. and
ratiooallyorgaoized restriction ofpopulatioo size" Cl:IUY 221). Interestingly enough. and this
point will be examined in the final chapler. Same tenns 'scarcity· as being a fact and DOt a
DeeeSSity. Here the irq)licatioo is that because scarcity is Contingent', it is poSSIble that it can
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Sanrestates:
for a historian in 1957. scarcity is DOl the basis ofall History. We have 00
way oflclling whether. for different organisms 00 other plaoets - or for our
descendeot. iftechnical and social cbaDges shatter the framework ofscarcity
- a diffetc:nt History, conscituted on another basis. and with differeot molive
forces and differem internal projects. might be logically cooceivable (COR
125).
While scarcity is not tbe basis "of all History", it is, according to Same. the basis of all
history up 10 the present. Scarcity is Qot an attitude that we as a social body have lakcn
IOwards our material field.. Ralber, it Mis a very basic human relation. bolh 10 Nature and 10
as a real and constant lension bOlh between man and his eovirooment and
between man and man. which explains fundamenla.l structUres (techniques
and institutions) - not in the sense that it is a real force and tbat it has
produced them. but because they were in the milieu ofscarcity by men whose
praxis interiorises Ibis scarcity cven when they try to transcend it (a2B, 127).
Scarcity is lbegrandorganiser, as 00 ooe escapes its wralh: Hscardty is everywhere preseot
but appears oowbcre by itself' <I:mY 37). It points its 'men finger' at everyone and becomes
Man objective social Sb'UCtllTe ofthe material eoviroomeotM<CD.R 131). The 'social structure'
which scarcity fabricates is one where we see the resources ofthe world as being iII limited
supply and as a result we iIllemalize this Dotion into bow we see both our self and otben..
Al tbis point we can see a parallel betweeolbe thought ofSartre and what Hobbes..
in the~ says about life in the natural cooditioD. Similar to Ibe paraUel between Hayek
be overcome.
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and Same. the panUel between Hobbes and Sanre appears to be an oddity as Hobbes.. the
Father of modem liberalism is usuaUya larget of Marxist social analysis. Nevertheless. the
paraUel between Hobbes and Sante rests upon botb tren's conviction tbal prior 10 Ibe
formation of any 'anificial' social organization. life is a bitter conflict with others. For
instance. Hobbes claims:
if any twO men desire the same thing. wbic.b. nevertheless they cannot bolh
enjoy. they become~ and in the way 10 Iheir End. (wh.icb is priocipaUy
tbeir own conservalion. and sorretimes !heir delection only,) endeavour 10
destroy or subdue one another (L. 87).
Unlike Hobbes. Sante does 001 imply that life prior 10 any social orgaoisation is one of
explicil 'general warfare'. But oevenheless. Sanre maintains Ibat life under the guise of
scarcity is one of implicit violeDCt; and coercioo. Sanre explains:
nothing - not even wild beasts or microbes - could be mote terrifying for
man than a species which is intelligenl. carnivorous and crueL and which can
understand and outwit human intelligence. and whose aim is precisely the
destruction ofman. This. bowever. is obviously our own species as perceived
in others by each of its members ill the context of scarcity <OlB 132).
Scarcity resides in our original need. as it is under the context of scarcity thai need
originates. For instance. when we aet upon an original need such as hunger. we do 50 in the
context oflhere not being enough for everyone. In tbis situation we arc indirectly fulfilling
our need against everyone else. as we iIlterna.lize the other as a surplus in a scarce
environJnmt. The other is a threat to our existence because her very presence tbreatens the
satisFaetioo of our needs. We do oot recognize the other as the only threat:
this constant danger of tbe llDDihiialion of myself and of everyone is not
somelhing I see only in Others. I am myself that danger in so far as I am
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Other. and designated by the aeterial reality of the enviroomeot as potentially
surplw with Others (CDR 130).
Same maintains tbat ~I am Otber~ because 1 am myself that excess individual who is
pOlentiallyexpendable. 'f' am an excess individual in a material world where Ihere is not
enough for 'me'. Jet alone 'you'.
It is irt1x>lunt to oote that Same. unlike Hobbes.. does not claim that we are
'naturally' incliocd to view the other" as a source ofcooflict. As we have seen. Sanrc explains
tbal reciprocity can be either positive or negative. In both cases we recognise the olber as
being the same. but also 'other-than-me'. But within the context of scarcity. the other like
'me', becomes a non-human man: "everyone is anon-human man for aU Otbers. and considers
all Others as DOo-bwnan men. and actually treats tbe Otber witbout hwnanity" (am (30).
Funber. Sartre explains:
these remarks ofcourse I1'l.ISt be undemood in a proper sense. tbat is to say,
in the light ofthere being DO such tbing as hwnan nature. ... It must therefore
be understood both that ma.c's DOD-humanity does 001 come from his nalure.
and that far from excluding his hwnanity. it can only be understood through
itCCnR 130).
Here it is i:rl1>1ied that it is only Ihrougb praxis that we can understand how scarcity seeps into
our relations. as scarcity directly pertains to our projects in the world. As we shall see,
scarcity is what designates us as candidates for specific social roles.
2.7 Matter as Inverted Pra:ds
We can recall from the section on labour tbat Sanre recognizes a strange occurreoce
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which takes place when praxis becomes reflected in maner. For instance. a created object.
such as a ladder. acrually dictates its use to us. Funher. when we follow the commands oftbe
ladder. we oursetves become an incn eXlensioo of it. The recognition of this phenomenon is
not original to Sartre. as it bas also heeD recognized by the likes of Marx and Lukacs and
explained under the beading of'retisbism'. For instance. Marx. in CiQiW states:
a commodity is therefore a mysterious thing. simply because in it the social
character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped
upon the product oftbatlabour (C 83).
Marx mai:Dtai:ns thaI our labour. or in Same's terminology. praxis, is aetuaUy imprinted in tbe
objects which we create and appears as an objective factor. And Lukacs in Reificatioo And
The Coosciousoess orThe Proletariat' from HigOry and CaM Cgnsciousness claims:
the transformation of the commodity relation intO a thing of ghostly
objectivity· cannot therefore coDtem itself with the reduction ofall objects for
[he gratification of hwnan nwis to corrmodities. It stamps its imprim upon
the whole consciousness of mao (HCC 100).
Lukacs likewise recognizes thaI the comrodity is DOl~Iy a tbing for our consumption. btU
that it also possesses a strange aaivityofitsowo. We can see from both men's use ofpathetic
fallacy io their descriptions that they recognise that the commodity is Dot simply a passive
thing. Rather it is explaioed as beiog a 'mysterious thing'. or a thing of 'ghostly objectivity'
because it ·proposes itselfto rrv:n and imposes itselfupoo them; it defines them and indicates
10 them bow if. is to beused-c.c:u& 161). It is almost as ifa commodity can comrmmicate 00
its own.
While Same acknowledges that fetishism does occur within capitalism. be is at tbe
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same time hesitam to limit it to any one specific ecODOmX: or political system The maiD
reason for this is that Sam wants to talk about fetishism UDder the more general beadmg of
reification. The oanue ofreification "is not a metamorpbosis oftbe individuaJ into a tbing. as
is often supposed. but tbe necessity imposed by tbe strucrures of society on members of a
social group" (.Q2B. 176). Rcification pertains to praxis being objectified in matter and in tum
dictating imperatives to us.' This phenomenon is problematic when it seeps into our very
being and allocates us for a specific social situation. This is crucial to Same's thought in the
~ for rern:niJer in the section The Labouru Wilhi" Society. it was observed that we
do DOt recognize the other as being human. l:x.tt rather we recognize the otber by their project
in the worid. As we shall see shortly. Sartre maintains lbat alienation is a constant cotq)anion
of reification.
2.8 Alienation and the Practico-Inert
Sartre explains that "it is important to be clear what it means by saying tbat a society
designates its undernourished producers and selectS its dead" (Q2B. 153). Further. Sanre
claims tbat ~Engels was right to sa~:
wben two groups engage in a series of cootraetual exchanges. ODe of tbern
will end up expropriated. prok:tarianised and. often. exploited. while tbe otber
concentrates the wealth in his own hands. This takes place 'm violence'. but
not 'by' violence: and experiencing exchange as a duel m this way is
characteristic oftbe man of scarcity (CDR 153).
, The specific term which Sartre employs for tbis phenomenon is exigency.
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As it bas already been noted. scarciry pcrpetUatt!S relations of oon-hwnanity between humans.
The 'rrJlnofscarcity'. moreover. is doomed to fatl~ evtn though he may tty to remedy it.
his remedy usually causes the disease 10 be more far reaching than before <n:1Q.Il!S 95). Such
a noc:ioo is exer11>1ified by the emergence ofindustrialization in late eighteenth and nineteenth
century society. £0 this specific hislorical situation. the discovery of coal and iron entailed the
creation of new tools and new machines wbicb in rum crealed vast amounls of wealth. But
at the same time. poverty still remained and in some areas was more rampant lhan before.
Same explains thaJ: '"the future comes to man through things in so far as it previously
came to things through man- (CDR 118). The case ofcoal excq:llifies this claim. as coal was
"derived li"om vanished vegetable maner" and was therefore "capital bequealhed to mankind
by other liviog beings" (CI2R 154). But the mining ofcoal as we shall sec shoilly. had far
reaching iDfluences in future society. Sartre Dotes:
from the point of view of intelliglbility the imponant thing is to comprehend
how a positive faCl. such as tbe large scale use of coal. could become Ibe
source ofdeeper and rrore violent divisions between people within a working
society. a society which was also seeking to increase its social wealtb by all
available means (CO& ISS).
The large scale use ofcoal ~gave rise to steam traospon. railways (which are very directly
linked 10 mning since tbeir original function was to serve it), gas.lighting. etc." <.C.Q..B. 154).
Steam traospoIt and railways were created with the intended goal of speeding up tbe process
of mining. Under the guise of scarcity, such means were necessazy. as "mines are oot
inexhaustible" (CDR 154). But:
tbe undeniable result ofwbat bas been sometimes called the 'palaeontecbnical'
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period was the partial destruction of tbe structures of the old society. the
prolctarianisation ofeenain groups and their subjugation to thc twO inhuman
forces of physical fatigue and scarcity (CD.R 154).
Industrialisation. by bringing about a shift of fonunes. became a very real -socialfuture ~ It
became a lived project which influenced many, even if they bad DO hand in the original
project.
The social ft.llure which industriali~tion perpetuated was one where a segment of the
population was viewed as being disposable. Sanre explains:
the first people to work in factories and mines in England were paupers. tbat
is to say, peasants who had been designated. sometimes from fatber to son,
as'dispensable surplus population as a result of the complex movement of
agricultura1 economcs and the hard policies of bourgeois land-owners (CD.R
155).
The paupers' vulnerability to industrialization could probably be explained by a previous
mode of scarcity. But nevenheless, the peninem thing to note is that the discovery of coal
literally corralled those who had previously made tbeir living off the land into industrialized
cities. But these peasants were none the better off than they were prior to the discovery of
coal Before their projects consisted ofhalVesting the feeble remains of the land. Now their
project consisted of the mining of coal in sub-human conditions for others. The discovery of
coal and its subsequent production of-the iron coal men" is representative of how a material
thing, through the interpretation of praxis, is capable of structuring and re-structuring a
society into tbose who have and those who have not. The example of industrialisation serves
to show how classes of masters and slaves, in a world of scarcity, are inevitable.
What arc the similarities and differences between Hegel's and Same's conception of
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rRiISIer aod slave? lD The Pheoo!"JXDOlogy QfMjnd Hegel states tlw -an individual makes its
appearance ill antithesis to an individuaJ- reM 231). Such a claim is a logical conclusion of
Hegel's philosophy, as it maintains tbat we originally satisfy our selves by mastering things
which will curb our bodily desires. Because 'originally' objects are pure undifferentiated
malter. Hegel maintains that we desire [0 negate or destroy tbem Kojeve explains Hegel's
position as foUows:
born ofDesire. aaioo tends to satisfy it and can do so only by tbe -negation,-
the dc:struaion. or at Ieasl: me lransformation. ohhe desired object:: 10 satisfy
hunger, for exall1>1e. the food IWSt be destroyed or. in any case. transfonned
a&114).
It is cbaracteristic of our activities tlw we desire [0 master Ihe things which we corne in
COntacl. witb. Funber, we do Dot ooly desire to rnaster tbe inen things which we encounter.
but also the other.
Hegel explains that each self-consciousness "is indeed certain of its own self. but not
oftbe otber. and hence its own certainty ofitselfis S1ill without lruth" (.fM 232). In order 10
gain [rulh. Hegel maintains that wbett we encounter an olber, we engage in a struggle with
the intended goal ofobjectif)ting the otber. [0 regards to the struggle Hegel explains:
[hey musr: bring their cenainty of [hemselves., the cenainty of being for
themselves. to tbe level ofobjective In.ltb.., and make Ibis a fact both in the
case ofme other and in their own case as well (fM 232.233).
The certainty ofbeing for itself can only be achieved when one individual enslaves the other
by objectifying herself in the other. Here we have the emergeoce of a master (one who is
seemingly independent ortbe other) and a slave (one who is dependem on the other). In a
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master/slave relation. the masl:er- coorrols the state ofexistenee oftbe slave. The master-. by
pro'oriding the slave: wib her objective reality, views tbe slave both as an object which works
upon things and also as a being that is dependem upon her existence. Everything tbat the slave
docs is an activity oftbe master U.BJ:I18). Hegel claims:
the master. however, is the power controlling this state of existence. for he
has shown in the struggle that he holds it 10 be merely something negative.
Since he is the power dominating existence. while this existence again is Ihe
power controlling the other (bondsman), the master holds, par consequence.
this other in subordination (eM 235).
In Being and Nothjngness Same states that -conflia is the original meaning of being-
for-otbers" <.mi 415). Being-for-others is defined as:
the third ekstasis (q.lI./ oftbe For·itself. There arises a new dimension of
being in which my Self exists outside as an object for otbers. The For-othcrs
involves a perpetUal conftict as each For·itselfseeks to recover its own Being
by directly or indirectly making an object of the other (Illi 800).
Sanre, as we can recaU from the first chapter. iUustrates the notioo of being-for-others with
the example oftbe PeePing Tom'. [n this srtuatioo. 1 look at you' and You look aDd me' and
we engage in a ban'e wberewe Bnefl1'l to objectify each other. In this scenario one ofus will
emerge as tbe victor. Same in Iking and Nothingness borrows heavily from Hegel's
conception ofthe masr:er and slave relation. But in tbe~ Sann: modifies his position
from Being and Nmhjngnw and in rum modifies the Hegelian conception of master and
SialiC.
(0 an interview with Leo Fretz. Sanre descnbes Being and Nothingness as an abstract,
genetal philosophy. The~ 00 tbe other hand, is descnbed as being concemed witb tbe
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social and concrete ('AIWSPS' 22S). In the CJiI.iIw: Same repeatedly charges Hegel witb
idealism and subsequently disagrees with Heger~ conception oftbe master and slave on two
fundamental pomts.1 First, Hegel did not account for the role which scarcity plays in
structuring relations between otbers (CI2B. 158). ADd second, Hegel failed to recognize tbat
masters do not derive their idemity solely from slaves. but also from rellow masters.' Masters
according to Same. sedc. m:ognitioo mthe eyes of~Uow masters. as they justifY t!Jeir actions
by tbe actions of other masters. Hegel accordiog 10 Sanre. fa.iled to firmly ground his
conception ofmtSter and slave in Ibe concrete plalJe oftbe social world.
As nx:ntioocd previously, Sanre maintains thaI because existence precedes essence,
there is. therefore. 00 such thing as a buman nature whX:b &bricates relations among humans.'
We caD recall from lbe previous section that Sanre claims tbat it is scarcity which is
responsible for relations of non-humanity. Same in an interview stitcs:
I consider that scarcity is the phenomenon in which we Ilve. It is impossible
1 Sanres argum:m for why Hegel is an ideallst has already been presentcd in the first
chapter of tbis thesis.
• Same states that "in reatiry, the plurality of masters and tbe serial character ofevery
society cause the Master as sueh. even in ideal.isl teons.. to find a different truth witbin tbe
ensemble of his class. Slaves~ the truth of masters.. but masters are also the truth of
masters M <WR 1580).
'This elaimofSanre~ n::SlS upoo his beDeftbat the social world and the natural world
~mdica1lydilfereat. Sueh a elaim rests upon theassuJl1ltion that we as 'social'animals~
divorced from oa~ and nature therefore has no power over us. Sanrc explains that "the real
problems of the human species today, the problems ofclass, capital and so 00, are problems
thaI have no relation to Nature. They are posed by the buman species in its historical
movement, and that leaves Nature outside oftbemM('[WJPS' 29).
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to suppress it without changing the coooitioos of exisleoce. of what is rea.I
('IWJPS' 30).
In the social world. scarcity is the origin of conflict between Otbers. as scarcity ~makes the
passive tolalityofndividuals within a collecrivity into an impossibility of co-emleoccM UJ2&
129). Scarciry is the explanation which Hegel fdiJed 10 provide (as did Same himself in~
and NQlhingness) for how cODflicts betweeD others originate.
We have already seen. counesyoftbe exaJ11)1e of industrialization, how the discovery
ofcoal inadven:~eotaiIedtbereoc-g:anizatioofsociety. Funher. we can hypothesize bow.
after the irtitia.I coal rush. machines were invented in order 10 facilitate tbe extractioD ofcoal
Just as we have seen how it is possible for a malerial thing such as coal 10 inadvenendy
structure social relations. so too can we specuJate upon how a material thing such as a
machine can ~ome the lived reality ofits servant.
Same claims:
the machine defines and produces the reality of its servant. that is 10 say it
makes him a practice-inen Being who will be a machine in so far as the
machine is human and a man in so Iir as it remains.. in spite of everything else.,
a tool 10 be used: in sbon. it becomes his exact co!l1'lement as an invened
man «::J2R 207).
The machioe isproCtiCD-ineTt- it is the rc:suh ofpraxis. Its project penains to its owner and
her previous Iaclc of an efficieot means for qudening lbe process of extracting coal Once
lhe machine is ill place, it becomes an e:rigmcy - "it demands 10 be kept ill working order and
the practical relation of man to materiality becomes his response to the exigeocles of tbe
macbine- (.cI2R 188). Even tbough the machine is oot the result ofber praxis. it influences
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her firture project. The machine becomes her lived reality, as it defiDes her livelihood. She is
a superfluous labourer and without the maclli.ne she will Dot be able to survive. as she wiU be
without employment and wages. As a resuh. she SUCCWl~ io the ma.:bine and aUows it to
project itself upon her. She becomes a practicQ.iDert Being. as she becomes a madlinc for
operating machines <C,Q& 207).
In Hegelian terms Ihis situalion can be explaiDed as follows. First. Ihe labourer is
representative of the slave. as she has lost tbe banle. and consequently has been reduced to
the status ofa thing: she: is a praaieo-inen being. 10 such a scenario. Hegel explains that the
slave becomes the master's reality. An interesting situation arises. bowever from these
circurnstanc:es. On the ODe hand. the slave derives ber reality from an other (tbe master) - she
is subservient to the masters ~rives. 00 the other haod. because tbe masler has reduced
Ihe slave to being a thing, she. unlike the slave. has 00 other from whom she can seek
recogoil:ion. 10 this specific situation Hegel maintains that it is actUally the slave who is free.
as she bas the ability to go beyond herself, whereas tbe master does DOt. Kojeve explains:
tbe slave knows what it is to be free. He also knows thai be is not free. and
that be wants to become free.... The Slave, in transforming the given World
by his work. transcends Ihe given and what is given by that given himself;
hence be goes beyond himself. and also goes beyond the Master who is tied
to the given which, not working, be leaves intact U&1i 22-23).
Sartre ma.int:ai:ns that the master and slave are both f4Ileo in tbe praetie»-iDert workl.
as they derive their respet1ive 'interests' from maner. {merest is a specific form ofexigeDCy
which pertains to one ''beiog-wholly-outside--oneself-in-a-tbing in so far as it conditions praxis
as a categorical~~ <CD& 197). Interest is R a cenaiD relation between man and thing
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in a social field" CCDR 197). Illterests pertain to bow everyone. be they a master or a slave.
is vW:tm to tbepractico-iDen. III Same's world we au see ourselves as other. as we are both
victims of scarcity and victims ofour freedom being embedded in the pl1lClico-inen.
Sanre claims that tbe master is DOC~Iy aJ: an~ failillg to achieve recognition
(SM. 58). On tbe COlltrary. be holds that the master seeks recognitioll Rftom other masters
who reinfon::e tbe ideologyoftbe ruling CIassR (SM 58). For instance. if a French industrialist
"introduces Englisb machines. it is because tbe factory requires it in a panicular competitive
field. and therefore. already because it is Other and cooditiooed by OthersRU:DB. 200). Same
in a given sectorofindusuy. each manufacturer detennines tbe interest of the
Other to the extent that he is an Otherfor this Other. and each determines
himselfby his OWD interest to the extem that this interest is experienced by the
Other as tbe interest ofan Other <COB. 201).
On olle level we can see bow scarcity encourages the industrialist to acquire tbe English
macbine - it is in limited supply. as is tbe coal which it will process. and. therefore. it is
urgenttbaJ: l'gct one before ~: 00 another level because the industrialist's bcing-outside.
bmelfis her f.u:tory. she derives her destiny from it. and it becomes a categorical ~tive
which dictates to her what she IWSt do: because my COrT(letitor bas gotten a machine, it is
necessary that l' coWfter-arrack and therefore get olle myself.
Sartre makes an interesting point wben be states that "the machine could never be tbe
particular interest of the worker" (CD&. 208). The machioe cannot be the panicular mterest
of the worker because. as we have seell. the macbiDe defines the worker. as it is her
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Iivetibood.. It deme:s her as ~a pracrico-.inen being. deprived ofany panicular interest (and of
all possibility of having ooe), it also designates him as a geottal individual that is. as a class
individual" u::o& 209), For tbe industrialisr: the machine is ber panicular mterest. as it is a
pan of how she sees herself via ber factory. But as opposed to tbe labourer. it is oot her
livel.Lllood. as she does DOt have to face the foUowing dilemma: "increase the nwnber of
machines or go begging~ (CQR 200). But this does not mean tbat tbe industrialist is immuoe
to tbe imperatives of the practico-.inen. 00 the contrary. as we have seen. the industrialist
bmelfsuccumbs to the necessities which are imposed by her very belonging to a society of
industrialists.
Sartre's vision oftbe work! is ODe where everyone is contaminated by tbe praetico-.
inert. Same defines the practico-inen individual as:
the man who looks at his work. who recognizes himself in it completely, and
who also does DOt recognize himself in it at aU; the man who can say both:
'This is DOl: what Iwaoted' and 'r undemand that this is what I have done and
that I could DOt do anything else' (CDR 227),
We recognize ourselves in our work. as it is tbe resutr: of praxis. At tbe same time. we can
realize that we could nOI have doce anything else. as tbe 'context' for our pnttis bas been
defined in advance. Sanre explains lhat "as a Cultured'man (an expression which applies to
ewry mao. whatever his culture, and even if be is illiterate) I tola!ise myselfon Ihe basis of
cemwies ofbistory" CCJlR 54), As a 'cultured' man we find our reality pre.fabricated in the
mode ofpure materiality (CO& 232), We discover lhat the previous projects ofothers - how,
in the past. they have interacted with maner - directly pertain to how we. in tbe present and
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future. WIll projea ourselves upon tbe world.
Same poses the: question: Sbould necessity as the destiny in exteriority of freedom be
descnbed as alienation? And bis answer is both 'yes' and 'no'. Alienation for Same. unlike
Hegel. does not result necessarily wben we cxteriorne ourselves. as we are wont to do to
sustain otmiCtves. in an environment that is diffttent than us. Alienation. according to Sanre.
results when we cease to view ourselves as beiDg different than our environment and tbe
things which we produce within it. In this scenario. praxis that is embedded in maner - the
practieo-inen - eommences to fe-produce us. As a result. we find our future as being
partially projected for us. as we obey the exigencies oftbe practico·inen. Sartre eKplains:
there can be 00 doubt that as soon as man begins to designate himself not as
the mere reproduction of his tife. but as the ensemble of products which
reproduce his life. he discovm himself as Other in tbe world ofobjectivity.
tot.afised matter. as an inen objectification perpetuated by inenia. is in effect
non-hWfliln or even anti-hWfliln <.CI2.B. 227).
We are 'Other' in the sense that we become 'productS' armng productS. This entails that we
conform to the 'projects' of tbe practico·inen. Further. Sanre states:
whatconl~Marxists have forgotten is tbat man. alienated. mystified,
reified. ac.. still remains a man. When Marx speaks of reification. be does not
mean to show that we are transformed intO things but that we are men
condemned to live humanly tbe condition of material things (SfM 100n).
At this point we can see why Sante does not want to discuss alienation in tenns of
fetishism Sartre wants to maintain that it has been our bistorical interaction with the material
world which bas led to fetishism According to Same. fetisbism does not entail that an
individual metamorphoses into a tbing - an individual does nOt metamorphose into tbe
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practico-inen. Rather it entails that an individual obeys the~es of a thing - tbe
individual obeys tbe dictations of the praetico-inen. Fetishism is simply a logical conclusion
of following the imperatives oftbe praaico-inert. And these imperatives hark back to our
origioaJ need under the context of scarcity. Here we can sec that Sartre's cooccption of
alicoarion borrows from both Hegel. and Marx. It borrows from Hegel in the sense that Sartre
maintains that we originally see the otber as an enemy. Sanre uses Hegel's notion ofconfliet
as a lead in to Marx's conception of fetishism - it is because oftbc scarcity oftbe material
world that we snuaure buman relations accoc-ding to the structure of master and slave wbicb
in turn leads to atieuating stJUCnIreS.
2.9 Conclusion
The intent ofthis chapter was to provide an exposition for bow Same claims tbat we
fiod oursdves existing in an a1ieoaled. world.. On an abstract level we saw Sanrc's explanalion
for bow an indMduaI. satisfying her original need in natW'C. transforms tbe natural world intO
a material ooc. More irq)ortantly we saw the consequences of how a materiality perpetuated
by scarcity suuetures society intO groups of masters and slaves. In the next chapter. we shall
limber sec the consequences that materiality. as driven by scarcity. has on social groups.
Fwther. we shall see bow Sanre maintains that this inhumane structure can be overcome.
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ChaptulltJ'ft
From t.e Pl'llct~lnertFaeld to the Pledged Croup:
The Resurrectioa of Fl"ftdom
3.1 IDtroductioa
In the previous cbapler. we have seeD bow the material things we produce take on
a 'gbostlyobjectivty' oftbeir own.. A strange oa:urrerx:e talces place wbeu praxis is expressed
in mailer: the material tbing dictates its use to us. As a result. we become tbe passive
recipients of its instructions. as we abide by the elCigencies of tbe practico-inen. 'o In the
preceding chapter we saw also how scarcity and materiality render everyone subservient to
the 'practical unities: orwbat Same specifically terms tbe exigencies of the praetico-inert. In
this scenario we are fallen in a reified world, as we are slaves to the praetico-inert. 11 We are
alienated in the sense tbat we can only exercise oue praxis within the timits oftbe practico-
inert. The exjgeocies oftbe practico-ioen: bec.oIre our ~tives. as tbey prescn"be to us our
future. Further. reification does DOt come to a bait with the creation of material things.
Ratbe-. italsoeoco~ abstract things suc:b as 'class beiog'. In a reified world. class being
itselfbecomes a practico-ioert weight:
this is clearly reflected in our language. when an individual is said to be born
into the working cl.ass or fO have sprung from tbe proletariat (if he bas
10 From the glossaryoftbe~. practico-inen is defined as: "maner in which past
praxis is embodied~ (C.J;2R 829).
II Reificatioo., as explained by Same. pertains to tbe necessities which are imposed by
the struetw"e of society On members ofa social group (CDR 176).
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errEr'gCd from it) or to belong to it. as ifthe class as a wbok was a matrix. a
milieu and a son of passive weight (!:DR 252).
JuS!: as we have seen bow we become subservient to factories and machines. 50 too do we
also become slaves to our mode ofclass being. Class being is itself a 'practical unity' wbich
has mysterious powers analogous to tbose ofa material thing like a machinc.
In this chapter I will first analyse Samesconception of materiality as c1as.s~bcing. I
will then examine what Same terms to be tbe most conmon relation between humans.
namely. tbe series. [will demoostrate bow Same maintains that seriality can be overcome
by examining his analysis of the group in fusion. I will then conclude by examining what
Same terms Mlhe origin ofbumanity'". namely. the creation oftbe pledged group. We shall
see that the pledged group is \be origin ofbumaoity: as it is within this group that freedom
is resurrected.
In Sanre's early essay. Existentialism is a Humanism: he states that ~in life. a man
c:onmits bimsd( draws Iris own portrait and there is D04:bing but that ponrait~ ('EH' 359). In
Same's early pbilosophy, because existence precedes essence. one makes oneself into
whatever ODe desires: "tbe coward makes bimselfcowardly. the bero makes bimselfberoicM
('EH' 360). Same. inthe~, states that Rtbere can be 00 doubt tbat one makes oneself
a bourgeois... But in order to make oneself bourgeois. one tnIJS[ be bourgeois" <.Om 231).
In the~ we still dnw our own pOllrait, but we discover it as partially in progress:
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individuals find an existence already sketched out for them at birth; they bave'
their position in life and their personal development assigned to them at birth
(CUR 232).
Individuals find "an existence already sketched out for them" because they arc born into
circumstances which have been created by others. How others have interacted with the
material world has a direct bearing on an individual's development in the present.
Class. according to Sanrc, corrcsponds to the situation which we arc born into, as it
is from this situation that we inherit our 'interests'. We bave seen how intereSls12 pertain to
everyone. be they a master or a slave, as they are both vietirm oftbe practico-inert. Further,
courtesy of Sanre's analysis of industrialisation, we have seen how interests are capable of
structuring and re-structuring a society. Interests pertain to how the practico-inen organizes
us as candidates for certain class formations. Sartre maintains:
class-being, as practico-inert being mediated by the passive synthcsis of
worked matter comes to men through men; for each of us it is our being-
outside-ourselves in matter. in so far as this produces us and awaits us from
birtb (CDR 239).
Before our very birth the previous projects ofthe other win influence what our future projects
will be, as the others project will 'produce' us in the sense that we will produce ourselves
within the realm nftbe other.
According to Sanre, our class being corresponds to a cenain 'way of life' which we
are assigned. Sanre elaborates about the individual and the class being to which she belongs:
12 Interests pertain to bcing-wholly-outside-onesclf-in-a-thing in so far as it conditions
praxis as a categorical imperative (Q2B. 197).
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what is 'assigned' to them is a type of work. and a material condition and a
standard of living tied to this activity; it is a fundamental attitude. as well as
a determinate provision ofmaterial and inteUectual tools: it is a strictly limited
field ofpossibiHt;cs (CL!& 232).
Here we can sec that Sanre recognizes that some individuals arc born into situations which
arc more conducive to freedom than others. Even though we are aU subservient to the
practico-inen. the practico·inen organises us in te111'lS of the context that structures our
choices. Our awareness of the class to which we belong corresponds to what our future
possibilities will be. A5 a result, Same recognizes:
it would be quite wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free in all
situations, as the Stoics have claimed. I mean the exact opposite: all men are
slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the practico-inert field (CllR 331).
Because our life unfolds in the practico-inert field' our being becomes "the prefabricated
Future as a negative determination oftemporalisation" (CDR 245). The pure materiality of
the practico-inert field is capable of determining our 'life'. as it is within this mold that we
must project o~lves. Our future becomes "like an iron wall in translucidity", as it appears
that in the future, we wiu not be able to project ourselves out ofthe situation into which we
were born. The iron wall -restricts certain possibilities and provides a certain content on the
future towards which it is transcended~ (CDR 235). We appear to be predetermined to
occupy the class position into which we are born. But the 'iron wall' is not impenetrable, as
thc possibility of going beyond it does exist.
Before introducing the context under which Sanre maintains that we can go beyond
our prefabricatcd Being. it is necessary to examine, courtcsy the deepening of Sartre's
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dialectical investigation. what he deems to be the most common relation among hwnans.
3.3 Seriality
Sartre explains seriality as the -most obvious, immediate and superficial gathcrings·
which appear in -everyday experience- (.cD.R 252). Seriality corresponds to the notion that
although individuals frequently find themselves in similar situations with others. they at the
same time find themselves isolated from others. Sartre distinguishes between two types of
seriality •• the direct and the indirect gatherings -- which both share the common alienating
characteristics of isolation and impotence. The direct serial gathering is characterised by
presence while tbe indirect is characterised by absence.
In order to exCll1'lify a direct series. Sartre reports his observations of a queue which
is waiting for a bus. Upon first sight. the queue seems to have an appearance of unity. This
is only an iUusion since the appearance of unity is due to accidental factors. The accidental
factors pertain to the notion that the rrermers ofthe queue are united insofar as their interests
reside in boarding the bus. Their 'unity' comes from an object. as the bus is the instrument
which wiu satisfy each individual's need to get to where they desire to go. Sartre explains:
the bus they wait for unites them. being their interest as individuals wbo this
morning have business on the rive droite ... At tbis moment of the
investigation, the unit·bcing (eIre-unique) of the group lies outside itself. in
a future object, and everyone. in so far as he is detennined by the common
interest, differentiates himself from everybody else only by tbe simple
materiality of the organism (.CJ2R 259).
The common interest pertains to the fact that the bus (future object) wiu arrive at a certain
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time and will make stops at specific intcIVsls. But any notion ofcommonality stOpS hcre, as
other than boarding tbe bus, it is for purely accidental reasons that the members of the queuc
are 'united' as they arc. For instance. the queue for the eight o'clock Monday morning bus
may consist offourtecn individuals. It may include Pierre the waiter and Marie-France the
lawyer. Tomorrow at eight o'clock th~ queue may consist of twenty individuals. Pierre may
be there. Marie-France may not be. S4rtre claiJ:r6 tbat -to the extent tbat tbe bus designates
the present COll'l11.lters, it constitutes them in their interchangeability" (CDR 259): 'anyone'
can cnter the queue without affectin/t it in any important way, as it exists specifically for
anyone.
Sartre explains that the individuals ofthe queue have no common goal. as tbey "do
not care about or speak to each other" <CD.R 256). Although the individuals of the queue are
physically present to eacb otber, they interact minimally: "Every person is very much alone-'
(CUR. 257). The individuals ofthe queue are 'very ITI.1cb alone' because they represent the city
and its project. They are representative of an instance of social massification. For example,
an individual's getting to work for nine ()'c1ock in tbe morning becomes dependent upon her
boarding the eight o'clock morning bus. We can see bow an individual becomes subservient
to the social system ofwhich she find nerselfa part. 00 a work day her itinerary is partially
planncd in advance, as sbe 'must' go to work and she 'must' board and depart tbe bus at
specific places and at specific times. in order to reach ber place ofwork.
On a broader level we can recall from the previous chapter how the emergence of
industrialization in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries drew the peasants from the
62
country to the cities. The peasants were oot hand chosen; rather the very project of
industrialization suggested that 'anyone' couk! perform the tasks which the peasantS were
given. The queue waiting for the bus is a twentietb-century example of how the city and its
projea affects and SUUctures individuals. Just as the factories brought the peasantS from the
land to the city. 50 too does the bus bring its passengers from their dwellings to tbe bus stOp.
The individuals do not wait ill the queue with the expressed intention ofsocialisillg. Ratber
tbey enter lbe queue with the purpose of taking the bw and allowing it to carry tbemoffto
their respective destinations. All the iIldividuals oftbe queue take their cornnands from the
'practical unities' of the city. Be it the bus they wait for, or tbe job which they will go to. they
all foUow the imperatives oftbe practico-illert.
The queue wailillg for the bus is an example of what Same terms a direct serial
gatberiDg. It is direct because the members. although 'socially' isolated from each other. are
stiu i1 the 'pbysicar ptt:SeOCe ofeach other. We shaD now proceed to examine Sanrei ootion
of an indirect gatberiog. This form of the series is characterized by absence. as opposed to
presence.
Sartre's maiD example ofan indirect gathering is a radio broadcast. This gathering is
characterized by the faa that the radio broadcaster is DOt witbin the proximity ofher :ludieoce
and tbe meoiJers of the audience. unlike the queue waiting for the bus. are pbysically
separated from each otber. As a result, there exists a relation of passivity between the
broadcasters and listeners. For instance. if I am listening to a cenain broadcast ~d I disagree
w1th it. I can turn the radio offor switch to another station. Yet I fail (0 silence the voice of
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tbe broadcaster. as it still reaches those who op: 10 cootiDue listening to tbe broadcast: -it will
continue to echo through millions of roorI'6 and to be beard by millions of listeners" «:l2&
272). Here arises the situation that if I have a disagreement with what tbe broadcaster is
advocating and I desire to make this disagreement public, I am confromed with the nearly
impossible option that to do so, I would have to sit down onc by oDe with each listener in
order to makc my disagreement lcoOWD:
as soon as I imagine some praetic:al action against. what tbe broadcaster says.
r can conceive of it only as serial: I would have to take the listeners one by
one <CDR 273).
In a dirca gathering iff have a disagreemem and I desire to make it publicly known
there exists the possibility tbat I can make it known. as I am in the physic:al presence ortbe
others. But in the indirect gathering. because { am not in tbe pbysical presence oflhe otbers.
I cannot reach out and cOrmJJoicate with tbem Hypothetically the possibility exists thai I
could phone tbe radio station. or even get a show myself in order to respond to the
broadC1lSl. But I would never be able to lcoow tbat my voice was being heard by the others
who listened to the 'original' broadcast. as I do nOt lcoow who they are. Funher. they may
have turned offtbeir radios while (was on the air, or they might DOt have had lheir radios on
when my radio show. in respollSe 10 the origila1 broadcast. came on tbe air. Sanre. in regards
to the indirect series. explains:
my impotence does not only lie in the impossibility of silencing the voice it
also lies in tbe impossibility of convincing. one by one. the listeners all of
whom it exhorts in tbe commoo isolation wbich it creates for all of them as
tbeir inert hond (QlR 173).
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The voice oftbe radio broadcaster becomes veniginows in that it becomes a coLlective el)tity
rwch like tbe bus - it is praC1icD-Lncrt. as it is lbe cmbodimeot ofprariJ. The voice is
advocating a specific agenda:
it appcaBasa sociaJ result of political praxis (oftbe government. in the case
ofa state radio station) and as sustained in itselfby a different cross-section
of listeners - those wbo are already convinced, and whose opinions and
interests it expresses (CIlB. 274).
We have already seen how we are powerless to make known any disa~nt we
may have with the broadcast. As we have seen. this is a near ~ssible task.. as -what I
aetuaIIy experience is absence as my mode of connection with the Others" <m& 272). The
very existence of the radio broadcast a.s5WI1eS that I am an individual wbo wiU passively
receive its agenda. as I am physically separated from others who arc listening and
consequently. I cannot reach out and communicate with them [n lieu of this. t can place
myselfin the position ofthe other. as someone who identifies with the political agenda being
put fonh. Here arises a violent contradiction. as "I become. in effect. both someone who
knows bow to refute such nonsense.. and someone who is liable: to be convinced by it- <CJ:2&
274). I am liable to be coovinced by the agenda of the progl1UTUJe. because I arrive at the
realization that the ageoda is reaching and affecting others and as a resuh. the opinion which
is being formed., will in the future affect my destiny. The opinion will become an exigency
which r lTUJSt abide by. And as a resuh. I will become "dominated by the way things are
publicly interpreted" (B! 264).
Same's analysis oftbe direct and indirect series respectively serves to exemplify how
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which characterises seriality and according to Sartre. altcrity as found in the indirect series
is the one which has the great doninance in the ~sociaI practico-inen field" (COR 270). What
is crucial to and cbaracteristic oflhe series is tbat impotence manifests itself in Ibe fact that
Ihe future is not shaped by the individual's goals. bill by the series ('5' 199).
Heidegger. in Being and Time, explains the 'bey' as follows:
in utilizing public means of transpon and in making use of informatioo
services such as the oewspaptt. every Olber is like the Dext. This Being-with-
another dissolves ones awn Dasein completely into the kind of Being of , he
Others: in such a way. indeed. that the Others, as distinguishable and clCplicit.
vanish more and more (1lI 164).
Hcideggcr claims that when Dasein makes use ofa public means she loses her individuality.
as she becorres Doe afthe 'they'. The 'they' is an abstract power wbich generates tbe opinion
lhal 'I' rrust dowbat tbe'tbey' lhinkis~.Asan:suh..lbecoocme individual becomes
dominated by the group-think menlality oflbe '(bey'.
Same, in regards to tbe queue waiting for tbe bus, elCplains Ihat it ·expresses the
degree ofmassijication oftlle soeiaI etlSefli)Ie., in so f.u as it is produced 00 thc basis of given
conditioos~ (.QlR 257). The 'given coodilioos' con-espood to whal the 'they' think is
inlJortaDt. 'They' think we should wait for lbe eight o'clock bus. 'They' think we should live
and work: in tbe city. According 10 Sanre we all becorn: a 'they', or more specifically an
'other', as we are aU "effectively produced by the social ensemble" of which we are a pan
IJ In the glossary aherity is defined as: "a relation of isolation. opposed to reciprocity'"
=827).
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<CDR 259), We an follow the~ ofour 'social eosorble', We are aU mass produced.
Asa result:
the truth becolMS obvious for everyone oot only in so far as it is oegative and
relates 10 the Other, but also ill so far as it is lransmitted by an Other in 50 far
as be is OIher. These are Ihe rules ofbelief. what everyone believes oflhe
Other is what the Other conveys in so far as he is Other (or in so far as the
news comes to him already from an OIber). In other words, it is negative
informatWm in thai neither tbe person who receives it, nor the one who gives
it. could or can verify it (.cD.R 298).
'Massification' is Sartre's term ror Heidegger's tbe 'tbey'. Both Same and Heidegger
agree that ooce oae succwnbs to the public: they become an "anyone'. The exigencies ofme
bus stop or any other public thing C1".ist for 'anyooe' and do DOt specifically address the
lndividual Ralber. their Vcf)' existence is designed to perpetUate massificatioo or 'theyocss'.
Seriality according to Same. pertains to bow. in He1deggerian tenns, we prevenl ourselves
from achieving an authentic life, Funber, seriality is Same's bridge between Heidegger's the
'they' and Marx's notion of'fetishism',
Pietro Cbiodi. in Sann: and Maorism. DOtes tbat Same's conception or seriality serves
as a bridge between the philosophies or Heidegger and Marx. Chiodi. in regards to seriality.
explains:
Marx and Heidegger encounter each other here because aU Heidegger's
investigations - and tbose of existentialism generally - on the subjccl: of
banality. levelling and dc·perwoalization are seen by Same in a Iighl lhat
suggests a Marxist origin in tbal be regards these phenomena as tbe
consequence oftbe alienated relationship between man and the products or his
activity <S&M 64-65).
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Further. as (ogren Knecht •• palDtS oul, Sanre's conception of seriality is an anempt to
broaden Marx's notion of fetishism ('5' 188).
Marx. ie re-~d to 'producers' and 'values'. sute:
the character ofbaving a value. when 0CICt ~ressedupon a product. obtains
fixity only byreasoo oftbeir aaiDg and re-actiDg upon each other as quantities
ofvalue. These quantities vary contiDually. independently of the will foresight
and aaionsoftbe producers. To them. their own social actioo takes the fonn
oflbe actions of the objects. which rule the producers instead ofbeing ruled
by [hem (C 86).
Marx recognizes Ihat ill oreler for something to have a value. we rtJUS[ act as if it bas a value:
we rTI!Sl place a value upon so~hing.But what bappens is the value which we place upon
som:thing bas unforeseen coosequences. as it becomes an object ofco~itionwhich stam
to 'coerce' those who originally bestowed value upon it. Knecht states [hat "Sanre is not
concerned with the descripfion of concrete phenomena such as the constitution of price and
tbe process in capitalw ('5' 196). Ralher, Sanrc desires to read tbe above passage from Marx
aDd Engels ill the light thaI we area/I producers ofvah1es.. We aU contnbutc to tbe production
orthe exigencies which end up coercing us witbin the praetico-inert field.
Seriality corresponds to finding ourselves within a social setting which has specific
social ~rives. We passively confonn to these social imperatives and consequently. lose
oW" 'self in the everyday exigencies whic:h we eocoumer. We become 'their thing' «:0& 323).
I. Sartre himself makes this point in Search for I Method when he states tbat
"Marxism remains uncertain as to the nature and origin of these 'coUectives'. The theory of
fetishism. outlined by Marx. bas never been developed; furthermore. it could not be extended
to cover aU social realities" <.S.EM 77).
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Hcidcgger claims:
Dasein's absorption in the 'they' and its absorption in the 'world' ofconcern
make manifest something like afleeing of Dasein in the face of itself -- of
itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-SelfOIT 229).
Sartre, like Heidegger, maintains that our freedom is hindered, as we find ourselves within a
collective that sees its future possibilities as already actualised. But Sanre claims that
something positive can derive from seriality. as within the series there are members who
attempt to overcome tbe inhwnan serial structure oftbe series and attempt to posit a group
on a more humane, authentic level: one where intelligibility does not derive from the
exigencies oftbe practico-inert, but instead from freedom
3,4 The Group in Fusion
We have seen the two fundamental characteristics of seriality: the predominance the
practico-inen can have over our social reality and the resultant feeling of impotence or
passivity which accompanies it. Sartre makes a distinction between the series and the group.
The distinguishing mark between tbe two is tbat tbe former is relatively unorganized (it bas
no structured conunon purpose) while the latter is tightly organized (it has a structured
common purpose). The series bas no common purpose because it is loosely organised and its
'unity' comes from without, e.g., a bus or a radio broadcast. The group on the other hand, as
we shall see, is tightly organised and its unity comes from within.
A group in fusion is Wa newly formed group, directly opposed to seriality, and
unstructured" (CDR 828). A group in fusion is unstructured because it is still tied to a serial
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mode ofbeing. But as its DmE suggestS. the group in fusion is a group that is in the process
of IiquetYing seriality. The group in fusion is ill tbe process of structUring itself towards a
convnon purpose.
In order to exemplify tbe characteristics of a group in fusion. Same provides an
aoaIysis of the events which led to tbe stonning oflbe Bastille duriag the French revolution
of 1789. In this spec1fic situation M on the morning ofSWlday 11 July, the city was fuU of
poslers by order of the mg' annoUDciag the coDCel:ltratioo of ITOOps around Paris was
iDtcoded 10 protect the city against bandits~ «J2& 353). Georges Lefebvre, in~
2Ll.1!2, explains:
tbe idea that tbere were brigaDds' in and around Paris was a fairly genenl one
and indeed the king bad Ieut it~ in order to justify his calling oftroops;
the bourgeoisie tOO needed the Ihreat of brigands as a legitimate excuse to
foon their militia. These brigands. whose existence was so desperately needed
for political reasons. were in fact tbe floating populati:m of Paris. mainly the
local unemployed emf 125).
Rumours began to circulate tbal the prescnce of lhe troops was oat to deter hrigands.. but
acrually 10 quash the possibility araoy rebeUious activity withiD the city. Sanre states tbat ~the
deployment of troops and Ibe beginning ofthe encirclement bore Ibeir objective meaning in
themselves ... they designated the Parisian population as tbe unique object ofa SYSlematic and
symbetic extemliDation~gn" «J2& 353). Although the government did Dot specifically
command the troops to extennioate -the floatillg population of Paris-, Ihe very act of
deploying troopS suggested that such an order was a real poSSibility. This very threat of
eXlerminatioo opened the door for the future POSSIbility of moving beyond seriality. Ahhough
70
still in a serial mode ofbeillg. tbe members oftbe group in fusioa. under tbe threat of death.
recognize in the other what they recognize in themselves.. namely. 'you' like 'me' are a
potential victim.
Sanre notes:
by threatening 10 destroy seriality through the negative order ofa mauacre
the troops. as practica! units. provided the totality, which was experienced by
everyone as a negation. or a possible oegatioo of seriality (CDR 354).
Because it was possible that the troops would literaUy destroy a certain segmem of the
populatioa. and in the process negate seriality. the members ofthe series (the totality) began
to see themselves and each other in a different light. Prior to the threat the notion of
reciprociry which existed was one which emailed separatioo: remember that Sanre Slates that
the members oftbe queue waiting for tbe bus ace 'very rwch alone' CC!lB. 257). They are
moe because they fulfill their 'corrmon' ooed. to catch tbe bus. in solitude. In the series each
member excludes the other directly while at the same lime joining with the other in tbe
in1Jcrsonal aet ofcatching a bus ('S'I' 320). But with [he advent of the threat of mass death.
or what Sanre tenns the Apocalypse. the previous reciprocal relations arc modified. Sanre
explains:
everyooe continued to see himself in the omer, but saw himself. tbat is to say,
in this case. as a totalisation in himielfoftbe Parisian populatioa. by the sabre
blow or the riRe shot wbich would Icil.I him <COB. 354).
In an Apocalyptic scenario what everyone sees in themselves and in the other is violcnce and
death. Because death is Dear. everyooe anempts to defend themselves. Here we have the
origin of a common purpose. as everyone bas the 'need' to avoid death.
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Same ootes tbat the situation that gives rise to a conmon purpose is sometimes
mistakenly called "imitation'or eontagioo: as it is~ that a snowbaU effect perpetuates
the actions. For instance, someone is running to arm betself. so I. tberefore, must copy her
actions and ann myself. But what is mistaken about such an explanation is that it fails to take
into account the ootion ofselj.lfi.Jcovery. Even though we may mimic the actions of the other.
we ourselves become aware that it is 'our' aaion.s. as combined with the other, whicb are
contnbuting to a shared future:
imitation is also self-discovery through doing one's own action over tbere in
the Other, and through doing tbe action of the Other here. in oneself. fleeing
ones own flight and that ofthe Other. launching a single anack both through
tbe Other and with one's own fist. without either understanding or agreement
(it is exactlytbe opposite ofan understaoding). but realising and living alterity
00 the basis of the sytIthetic unity ofan organised.jUture totatisation of the
gathering by an outSide group tC.D& 354).
Just as when we are counting cigarettes.. we only have a fleeting awareness ofour activities.
so too does tbe rebel only have a fleeting awareuess ofberself when initially engaged in an
uprising. But if she were 10 SlOp and reflect upon I:ter actions she would discover that she is
engaged in a rebellion.
One ofthe~ differeoces between the series and the group in fusion resides in the
distinction between 'observing' versus 'acting' ('5'1' 322). For instance. we can recaU from
the previous chapter that Same. by obscrvmg two labourers at work, arrives at the cooclusion
that bis observation deprives tbe situation of an aspect of its reality. By observing the
labourers, Same is only able to col'l'llrebcnd wbat distinguishes him from them and them from
bim Sartre, by gazing at the workers. establishes a unity between himselfand tbe workers.
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but it is a loose unity. as be is only obsc:rviDg and reflecting upon his own and the workers'
Specific projects io tbe world. as together they have 00 common purpose. Same, by gazing
out onus botel window. arrives at the realization that he is a vacal~cing imelle-::ual who is
observing both a gardener and road·rIEDder at work. l.n this specific example, Same tbe
observer. takes on tbe role oftbe tbird. as it is !lis gaze which unifies the two workers with
hirnc;elf(tbc two workers cannot: soeeacb other, as tbey are separated by a wall). As we have
seen. Same cannot avoid objectifYing himself. or the two labourers. as tbey do not share any
common purpose. As we shall see. the tbird within the group in fusion does not view tbe
Otber as an 'objeaive' eOO. but rather as an 'active' subjea involved in a cormnon end.
Sartre, with regards to the group in fusion. Slates:
the group in fusion tears everyone away from bis Other.Being in so far as he
is a Ihirdpony in relation to a certain constellation of reciprocities; in short.
it frees tbe ternary relation as a free inter-individual reality. as an immediate
human relation UJ2& 367).
In the group in fusion we DO longer recognize the Other by tbe objective roles their praxis
takes in the wood. UDder tbe threat of an ~ding death what our previous projects were
in the world is of no significance. as the significant task at band is to save our lives: at tbis
moment we are freed from the coercion ortbe practico-inen. The group in fusion ensures that
we recognize other individuals as being the same as we are - individuals united in a COO1TlOD
Same States that "flight. conceived as a corrmon praxis reacting to a common threat,
becomesflighr as an active lotality~ (COB. 370). Flight becomes an active totality because it
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is M a common. organised actioo n <CDR 370). Sanre. like Camus. maintains that "every
rebellion inlllies sorre kind ofunity'" <& 12S}. When engaged in flight. tbe individual is fleeing
from death and consequentiy. tbe group~ the iodividuaJ's COImlOn reality. as the
acrioos oftbe group are the individual's concerns. I depend on your aetioos to save me from
death. just as you depend upon my actions - "r rebel., therefore we existM CB, 250):
in this praaice. this means that I am integrated intO the cornnon action wbeD
tbe COITI'OOIl:praris oftbe third party posits itselfas regulatory. I run with all
the otben; I shout: Stop!: everybody stops. Someone else shouts. Let's go!'
or. To the left! To the right! To~ Bastille!' And everyone moves off(mR
319).
The third party is anyooe witbio the group, as praxis no longer belongs to the other. but
rather it panakes in tbe common unity of tbe group. within the group everyone is tbe same
as we are:
the original structure of the group derives from tbe fact that free. individual
praxis. can objectify itself, in everyone. through the totalising silUation and
in the totalised object, as free. common praxis (02& 395).
The battle in progress'becomes the objective stOicture of the group. as it is the lotalising
siruation'oftbe group. It is 'free. common praxis'. as individuals are no longer fulfilling their
individual projects but cooperating together towards a common project.
We have seen bow the individual from the group in fusion, under the threat ofdeath.
is motivated to a commn aet:ion against the pracrico-iDert which enslaves her. The individual
joins the group in order to panake in the common flight from tbe fear of death. Sanre
explains that "the essential characteristic of the fused group is the sudden resurrection of
freedom" (CD.& 40 I). Previously. the other was a source of coollict. but here in tbe fused
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group the other is DOW a soun:e of freedom. We can see bow Same moves away from the
sadCHTl&SOclristic relatioDS of fk:inV and Nothingness, as under tbe threat of oppression. tbe
group in fusion entails a more genuine inter-subjectivity. Within the fused group freedom is
resurrccted. as the individuals of Ihe group are able to rise above the impotence of their
previous mode ofserial being. They are no longer indifferent to each othcr. as they are able
to bond together and structUre themselves towards a conmon goal.
It is i:rq)orum to DOle that Same claims that the fused group is the result of'ccnain
historicalcirc:wmt.ances'. ~Iy. "the danger ofdeath" and "violence" (C!2& 401). It appears
that Same. along the lines of Heidegger's analysis. maintains that it is the fear or anxiety of
death which motivates tbe individual. towards an 'authentic' life. IJ In the specific case of
Same in theCl:itiQuc. the fear ofdeathco~ indMduaisto break out oftheir serial mode
of being. For inswlce. Sanre claims:
the explosion of revolt. as the liquidation of the collective. does Dot have its
direct sources in alienation revealed by freedom ... there has to be a
conjunclion ofhistoricaJ circutnSlances, a definite change in the situation. the
danger of death. violence (CUB. 40 I).
This appears to correspond with Sanre's earlier statemeots about the Apocalypse in
Notebook for an Elhig;. where Sanre states:
the human momem.., the ethical mooen ofbberatioa is that of the Apocalypse.
that is oftbe bbenrioo of oneself and ofotben in reciprocal recognition. It is
almost often - paradoxically -the moment ofviolence~ 414).
IS We can see also how the fear ofdeath corresponds with Hobbes' beuef. aam::1y, it
tears individuals away from a brutish state and leads to their socialisation.
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According to Same. the individual can recognise her alieoatiolL, but she cannot do anything
about it. until she and others are confronted with deatb. But what happens to the group after
the (tanger ofdeatb'has subsided? How does it become pennanent?
3.5 The StatulOry Group
One ofllle first lbing<> which tbe group rnJSI3CCOIIJ;)1isb in order to ensure its survival
is to establish some degree of permanence:
lbe problem of the sulViving group (for it begins by surviving its original
plTlXi.J) suddenly becomes COODeC!ed for us with the problem ofbeing, tbat is
to say. ofperman~nCf! ea:ut 414).
The surviving group, according to Sartre. must establish pennaneoce because it faces both
an external and an internal threat. On ooe band. there is the cXlernal possibility that [he enemy
may return and as a result, the group must be prepared for a future caU to arms in order 10
defend itself. But tbe major threat 10 Ibe fused group resides in lbe possibility lbat its
individuals may defect and rerum to a serial mode ofbciDg. lndivM1ua1s may join the ranks of
tbe enemy and anerqn to suppress the fused group and as a resuk, quash the group's common
purpose. 10 order 10 prevent both seriality from reoccurring and individuals from defecting.
Sanre maiotaios that the members of the group ITIJSt take an oatb.
Sartre explains that ~wbeo freedom beco~ common praxis and grounds the
pennaneoce of the group by producing its own inenia througb itself and in mediated
reciprocity. this new statute is caUed the pledge (Ie sennent)" (.Q2R. 419). The members of
a group, by taking the oath. recognize tbat they have ana.iDed freedom and funher, that they
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will Shive to preserve d. The oalb takes the form oftbe pnctico--iDert. as it is tbe embodiment
ofpraxis. Same maintains that although the oath can take various forms. the universality of
all oaths pertain "to a surviving group's resistance to the divisive tendency of (spatia.!-
t~distance anddiffermtiatioo" (CDR 419). The members oftbe surviving group take
tbe oath in order to susta.in the close bonds which came into beiDg between its members in
conjunction with the Apocalypse.
By taking tbe oatb tbe members consent to their group relationship and agree to
maintain it as comnoo praxis. The oath becomes an exigency. as it ~ses necessities upon
the group. Same claims:
exigency, as we saw in our discussion of tile pra.c:tico-inert. is a claim made 00
some praxis by an inorganic matertility (C!lB. 426).
Exigcocy. in the coote~ ofthe pledged. group. "bas the sanr characteristic. but it is the agems
themselves that are inorganic inertia- <OlE 426). The members of the group who take tbe
oath are 'inorganic inertia' because they all agree upon the same project and funhe!'" agree that
they will project themselves within tbe agreed project:
in so far as the same project becomes. through my free pledge. a complete
respoose. deli~rately given by me. to this claim in the third party. it returns
to me through the third party. as faith sworn to the Other - and in tbe Other
- il is. therefore. a limitation to my freedom UJ2R 426).
The oath is 'a limitation to my freedom' because by taking it. I agree tbal I will confine my
project to tbe commoo project oftbc group. and the other will do the same.
According to Sartte. tbe oath bas a two-fold purpose which be descnbcs as 'fraternity'
and 'fear'. As we bave seen. the oatb unites the group with tbe cormroo goal ofsunaining
n
COtmlOOpraxis. Tbe~oftbegroup n:alizethat lbeydo DOt desire to return to a serial
mode of beiog. As a rc:suJt. when tbe members of tbe group take tbe oath. they unite
themselves as '~ct!="s':
everyone lives group-being as a Dature. •• [nbe relations of commoo
individuals within the group are ambivaleot links of reciprocity (unless tbey
are governed by the resumption ofthe struggle and the total objective): he and
I are brothers <02& 431).
'He and (' are brotbers because we are members oftbe same species and see ourselves as
such. We are DO longer the 'carnivorous' aDd 'cruel wild beasts' whose aim is the destruetioD
of man <02& 132). No loDger do we see the other asa stranger. Funber. 00 Ioogerare we
aIooe. Rather, we are beings wbc are uni.ed and co-operaIe together. lbe oath unites me with
my fellow 'brother' in so far as ( agree that 1. like be. am united in the common cause of
preservmg freedom Funher. we are united in so far as when I take the oatb. I as a ·common
individua!~agree that ·you lTUSt kill me ifl secede~ (CDR 431). I agree to the constraint that
if I act in an unfree way. I will forfeit my life. Sanre explains:
wlw maners is tbat DO usurpation ofvioleoce (or conquest of power) can be
intelligible unless violeocc: is initially a panicuiar, real. pn.cticaI hond between
freedom witbin common action - in other word$. unless this violence is the
kind of action on itself of tbe pledged group, in so far as this actioo is re-
created. carried out and accepted by aU (COR 431).
Sartre claims that because tbe pledged group is hom out of violeoce. it must in the future be
nourished by violence. Here the reasoning is that because it was the fear of death which
originally motivated the individuals ioto a group in fusion, this fear must be maintained in
order to keep the eohesioo oftbe group. According to Same it only makes sense [0 discuss
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freedom in conjunction with the fear of death. as it is nol umil1bese specific cirewnstaDCC:S
arise thai individuals will gravitate from lheir serial mode ofbeing 10wards freedom
3.6 The Birth of Humanity
Sartre's conception of freedom resembles Isaiah Ikrtin's. Berlin. in his essay 'Two
CooceptsOfUberty''''. main1a.ins IJw: 10 ooercean Ddividua.I is to deprive her of her freedom
Wbenan iDdividuaI iscoen::ed. she is 001 free. as beracrions are oot her own. Berlin maintains
that any discussion offreedom mJSI take ioto accoum hOlh a positive and a oegative side. The
negalive side addresses lhe question: in what realm should an individual's actions not come
into interference with an others? The positive side seeks to address the issue: wheo is it
neoessasylo ilqxIse some sort ofcomrol orreslTaim: upon an individual's actions? (fEL 122-
123). Berlin. as we sbaI.I see. will suess the ootion lhat Illy discussion of LibeftywiU prioritize
the: negative side over the positive. as it will maintain lhal the positive is simply a derivalive
oflhe negative.
Bertin stales ill the introduction to four Essays Og Uberty.
tbe~seoseoffrecdomisfreedom from chains. from ~risonmeot.
from enslavrmetll by others.... To 51rive 10 be free is to seek to remove
obstacles; to struggle for personal freedom is to seek to curb interference,
exploitation. enslavement by ITa:I wbose ends are tbc:ir's.. not one's own <ID.
M).
Berlin thinks of freedom as a plane in which any obstacles 10 an individual's actions are
•• Berlin. like Hayek. mainlains tbat tbe lerms 'Liberty' and 'freedom' are
inlerchangeable.
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removed. obstacles which coerce the individual into being a tool for Olbers. This explanation
correspoods with Bertin's oorion of'oegative' freedom: -tbe area within which a man can act
unobstructed by others- (EEL. 122), But Berlin claims that we canoot ascnbc absolute
freedom 10 [he individual - -we caMot remain absolutely free, and Iherefore must give up
some of our liberty 10 preserve the rest-~ 126). Aa:ordingly, Bertin notes that the
quesrioo that remains is: what then IIIJSt be !be minimum ofbbert}' which we must saaifice
in order DOt [0 degrade our nature?
The minimum amount oflibeny which we sacrifice penains 10 a constraint that we
must submit to in order to maimaio freedom Berlin explains constraint in tenns of a positive
freedom Berlin stales:
I am free because. and in so far as. I am autonomous. I obey laWs. but I have
imposed tbem 00. or found lbern in. my owo uoc:oen:::ed self, Freedom is
obedience. but 'obedience to a law which we prescribe 10 ourselves'. and DO
man can enslave himself(EEL 136}.
In a realm based upon freedom. obedience will lake tbe fonn of self-recognition. as I myself
will aCi in sucb a way that 'I' will prom:>te freedom (tbe absence ofcoercion) because I know
that 'you' will also aCi in sucb a way. Here is Berlin's constraint upon lbe aClivities of an
individual the minimun aroount ofbberty which we tn.tSt sacrific:e and which will not degrade
our n.ature: each individual mJSt abstain from acting in an unfree way both towards herself
and others. As a result. Bertin states [bat "rational mea wiU respect the principle of reason in
each otber. and lack all desire 10 fight or dominate one another" (m 146). In a society
where freedom reigns. oppression in lbe fonn of coercion will be eliminaled.
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Same's coocepIioo ofmmom as c::xen1>fified by Iilii discussion oftbe pk:dged group.
issimlarto Bertin's: freedom is the avoidance ofcoercion. l1 In the~Sanre is writing
againsl anything that coerces us mo being other lhan what we are - humans. Funher. Same.
again like Berlin, claims that in order-tO preserve freedom some fonnofrestraint is neo:s.sary.
This restraint takes tbe from of the 'pledge' in the pledged group. The one major difference
between Same and Berlin is that Sanre atterr,)Is to sbow how unfreedom and freedom occur
in a historical context.
J.7 eODdasioD
The pledged group. or. as Sartre tenns it. the Fraternity-Terror couplet. is the -birth
ofhumuUty". as it is within this group tbat individuals join together and rum [heir back upon
the alicnating structUreS oflhe practice-inen field. Within the pledged group the individual
is 00 longer "8 product ofhis product-. as instead he is a "product a/the group· (COR 672).
As we have seen. the fratcma1 relarioos whicb arise witbin tbe pledged group inllly that each
iDdividuai sees bersc:1f as a 'common individuar. No longer does the individual see the other
as an other. Rather. she sees the other as an individual like herself wbo is panicipating in [he
COOIIXJQ purpose ofmaimaining freedom. But retatioos offtaternity also coincide witb tetTor.
11 William McBride Dotes that the~ "cootains a disproponioo8te share of me
most memorable and interesting passages ... in which Sartre's c1ear·beaded outrage against
all kinds ofso-callcd laws and othcr rules tbat are supposed to be iron. inevitablc. and thing.
like. and tbat are constantly invoked 10 block us from evcn tbinking of acting for radical
change. comes [0 the fore- (ill 137).
8\
Terror must be instilled within the group in order to prevent any of its members from
collapsing into serial impotence. and also. to maintain the threat which originally led to the
fonnation of the group.
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Dupter-Four
Freedom aad tbe Fear of Death
4.1 Introduction
The aim ofthis thesis has been to trace lean~Paul Same's conception of freedom as
found in the Critiqye of Dialegjcal Reason' VoluIDC I Theory ofPractjcal Ensembles. We
have seen bow Same m:x1ifies his fonm1arioo oflieedom from tbat found in his earlier work.
Bejng and NOlhjngncss. This modification hinges on Same embedding the individual from
Bejgg and Nmbjngnm imo me historical, coocrete social realm Still intact in the~ is
tbe cooceplion ofme i:odMdua1 as a fi'c:e. projecting being. but what is missing is tbe absolute
freedom ascribed 10 tbe individual in Bejng and Nothjngness. The reasoo why such a ootion
is nBssing is si:n1>Je. Inthe~. Same. equipped with the modified historical materialism
of Marx and Engels. aniculates that history demonstrates that the social realm in which the
individual dweUs does impinge upon the individual's freedom Same argues that although
indMduals do make society. society also malc.es individuals. In the CdJ.iI;uLc. the individual's
futurt!. prior 10 the appearance of a group in fusion. II is prt~fabricated and the individual is
forced to live this prefabrication as her destiny. She DlUSl follow lrqleratives which dictate to
ber what her choices will be and., as a result. ber choices take place within a narrowly defined
sphere.
" In the g.Iossaryofthe.CJ::it.i.luK; a fused group is defined as: "a newly formed group.
directly opposed to seriality" (.c.o& 828).
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Same exerJ1'lifies this coercion in his dLscussioo ofa WOI11lD factory-wor1c.er who.
upon becoming pregnant. seeks an abonion:
when the woman in the Dop shampoo factory has aD abonion in order 10
avoid having a child she would be uoable to feed. she makes a free decision
in order to escape a destiny that is made for her, but this decisioo is itself
cOO1Jletely rrBnipulated by the ob;ecrive situarioo: she realises through herself
what she is already. she carries out the sentence.. wlUch bas already bcc:o
passed 00 her. wbicb deprives her offrec: motherhood <.COR 235).
The woman's actions are made to serve another, namely. the owner oftbe factory. Further.
ber objective situation is defilled in the sense that sbe earns a set wage doing a set job which
in tum allocates her for a specific sociaJ situation. Her choice to have an abonion is a free
decision within the context ofber social situation. For instance, she realizes that she will Dot
have a baby becau.se she canDOt afford to take time off from work. oor can she afford to feed
a child. Her alternatives with regard to cbiJdrm have been defined in advance. Sartre explains
that -freedom. in this cootext, does DOt mean tbe possibility ofchoice. but the necessity of
living these constraintS in the fonn ofexigencies which llI.J5t be fulfilled by a praxis~ (mB.
326). The working woman is eltecuting a senteoce passed on !O her (COR 782). Here wbat
Sartre means is that tbe social role which we inherit setS the guide !iDes for the role we will
play in life. as we will fulfilI our destiny within these guide lines.
10 chapter one. by rreans ofatl introduction to Sanre's methodology, we saw that
Sanre maimains that what is 'real' is 'human', as reality is a direct result ofhuman activities.,
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orwbal: San:re termspraxis. I ' In cbaptertwo we saw Same's atWysis of bow praxis becomes
bogged down in tbe practico--inen. lO In this situation. praxis. once expressed iII rmner
dictates its use to us. We become alienated in tbe sense that we see ourselves as wholly
outside in muter insofar as we take cues from tbe things witb which we interact. Further. it
is scarcity wbicb suucturCS oW" view oftbe world. wltid:I in rum inftuences our view ofothers..
In chapter three we saw bow Sanre's conception of'fetishism' does not come to a halt with
the things with which we iDletact; rather. it enters into our very Being. as we take 00 the
characteristics of the social collective ofwbicb we find ourselves a part. As a resuh:. Sanre
is led to claim that -all rra. are slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the practice-men field"
(COB. 331). Further. we saw thai with the appearance of'cena.in historical circwnstances'.
freedom can be resurrected. as individuals caD unite together and fonn a social group that is
DOl based on otbernc:ss. but rather upon humanity. i.e.• penoos as thinking and valuing. free
beings.
[0 this finaJ chapter I dem:>ostrate that Sarm's conception of freedom as found in the
pledged group. eDlails the necessity of twO elements. namely, the fear of death an<! the
specific materia1ci:rcurrntances which perpetuate this fear. Funher, [show that according to
Sanre. freedom is dependent upon destiny. as witbout the specific circumstances of their
I' From the glossary. praxis is defined as: "the activity of an individual or group in
organising conditions mthe light of some eod~ (CIlR 829).
10 [0 the glossary oftbe CritiQlg:, praetico--inen is defined as; -mancr in which past
praxis is embedded" <C.D& 829).
85
choices.. individuals cannot organise tbmJselvc:s towards freedom.
4.2 Scarcity Rrvlsit~
In the~, Same notes that ·scarcity must be seen as that which makes us into
Ihese particular individuals producing this panicu.lar History and defining ounelves as men-
(CDR 124). Furthef". Sanre swes:
in pure reciprocity. that which is Other tban me is also the same. But in
reciprocity as modified by scarciry. the same appears to us as lDti·human in
so far as this same man appears as radically Other - that is to say as
threatening us with death (02& 131-132),
As we saw, pure reciprocity can be either positive or negative. We can. as in the case of the
fused and pbiged groups. recognize our fellow human as the same as us and. consequently.
coopeme with bet towards com:ron goals.. Or we can. as with tbe case ofscarcity. recognise
our fellow human as otber than us and. consequently. see her as an impediment 10 our
individual goals. In the Ianer case the other is 'anti·human' because we see her as an object
that stands in tbe way of the satisfaction ofour needs. According to Sanre. it the negative
aspect of reciprocity which has coloured our history,
RaytOODd Aron remarks that "scarcity is everywhere present but appears nowhere by
itselr O:IDY 37). Scarcity is pm;em everywhere. as it is what produces us as these individuals
making this history. It is 'nowhere by itself' because. as Sante explains. it is a ·phenomeoon
ofexisteoce. a hwnao phenomenon" ('lWJPS' 31). As we have seen. without humans there
arc 00 oeeds. aDd. therefore. without needs there is 00 scarcity. Withinthe~. scarcity
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has aD elusive-like quality and Sann: equivocates OD the possibility of a worid without
scarcity. Same. ill aD interview in 1975. when asked ifhe foresaw in the future aD end to
scarcity. ttplies: "Not al the mommt- ClWJPS' 32). Aroo. in regards to Sanre's conception
ofscarcity. states:
Ilhink lhat it is necessary in the sense that every living species. in a natural
milieu ITom which it borrows what it needs in order to live. must come up
against certain limits (HI2Y 221).
Funber. Aron adds:
it is IJO( absurd to suggest. as Sanre does. thai: the aggression man bas for man
in pan comes from the fact that individuaJs cannot aU obtain goods that are.
in esseoce. scart:e u:w.y: 221).
If. as Aroo suggests., (and Sanretowards the Ianer pan ofbis life appears to suggest) scarcity
is a necessity and cannot be overcome. what is tbe possibility of fu:edom. as envisaged by
Sanre. ever being anained?
It appears that freedom as envisioned by Same, will have to be a freedom within tbe
context of scarcity. In order to eotenain a Dotion of fi"eedom within scarcity. we can see lhat
Berlin's notion of posilive fTeed.om is of UUDOSI. ~nance. As Doted previously. Berlin
maimams tbat we fWSt sacrifice. certain amount ofpersooal freedom in order to preserve
the frttdom oftbe social whole. Bertin claims that DO individuaJ should act m• way wttic:h
is unfree towards berself or others. In Sanre's tenns we can read Berlin as claiming that DO
individual should act in a way lhat is inhuman towards the other. Freedom within scarcity
in1>1ies that individuals relate [0 each other in such a way lhat [hey do not desire to 'fight' or
'domioate' one another, hut rather cooperate with one another. Freedom within scarcity
87
in1l1i!s that individuals seek the trutb oftbeir selves from fellow bwnans. But the questions
whieb remain and lTl.ISt be funher scrutinized are: How do the specific circumsl.anees arise
whieh aUow freedom to prevail? And can freedom pre"aii UDce these: circwnstances fade
away'? The fonner question will be addressed in the next section wbile [he laner will be
considcred in the conclusion.
4.3 Sartre aad Hobbes: freedom and fear
We saw in chapter three that certain 'historical circumstances' are prerequisites for the
coming into existence of a group in fusion: the original fonn of the group, according to
Same. is that:
it produces itself througb tbe project of taking the inhuman power of
mediation between men away from worked matter and giving it, in tbe
community, to each and to all and constituting i!sel( as stnJetured. as a
resumption of control over tbe rnaterialiry oftbe practie&l field (things and
coUeaives) by free communised praxis (The pledge. etc.) (CD.R 672).
The fused group is a group that desires t::l avoid coercion. as it is a group that is in the
process ofrebelliog against tbe oecessities imposed by worked matter (Ibe praetico-inert).
More in1x>nantly. the fused group has Ihe poteDtial to evolve into a pledged group. Sanre.
in regards to the pledged group. DOtes:
the group defines and produces itself DOl only as an instrument, but also as a
mode ofexistence: it posits itself for itself ... as tbe free milieu of free buman
relations; and on tbe basis of the pledge. it produces man as a free common
individual. and confers lIew binh on Ihe Other (CI2& 673).
The pledged group is a 'mode ofexistence' because it is a group whicb posits itself upon
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&eedom. As we have seen.lhe rnerrDers oftbe group take the pledge because they agree tbat
tbey warn to SO'Ucrurt themselves upoo fi'tedom and. further. tbey recognize that they do not
want to rerum to their prev;ous 'rrode ofexistence'.~. their unfree serial mode ofbei:Dg.
The individuals oftbe pledged group know what it is to be unfi'ec and. as a result. tlJey strive
to preserve freedom
Although the world which Same descnbes prior to tbe appearance of a group in
fusion is not oecessariIy 'nasry. poor. brutish and shan', it is. nevertheless. a world where
conflict betweeu otb~ is a pervasive mode ofexistence. Hobbes' explanation oftbe escape
from the natw'a.I state bears a close resemblance 10 Sanre's conception oftbe fused group-
a group whicb is seeking 10 escape seriality. At this point I wiU show that Hobbes' 'covenant'.
and its specific purpose. reseutlies tbe oath and the role that it plays within the pledged
group. WItbiD Sanre's modified Marxism the fear of death plays a crucial role, as it is at the
hean of both these parallels.
Hobbes maintains that in order for individuals to escape the perils of the state of
!WUre. they rwst boDd together and take an oath. The oath. or the covenant. as descnbcd in
the.l.&riiIhlD. is submission to a sovereign body ('some common power') which insures the
cornron well being oftbe group. Hobbes maintains that tbe motivating factor for individua1s
emeriDg ioto the covenant is the fear ofa shan life mthe state ofoature - the fearofa violent
death. Hobbes descnbes death as "that temble enemy of nature" which we at aU costs seek
to avoid (f 79). Sanre. in a similar vein. states tbat the "essential point" oftlle fused group
is its "struggle against death" cam 403). Just as it is the fear ofdeath that motivates tbose
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in Hobbes' statr: ofnanue 10 taketbe covcoam. 50 tOO is if the danger of "death' and'violeoce'
which Same claims originally co~1s individuals into. group in fusion.
Hobbes., witb regard 10 the consent ofthe covenanl. stales:
it remainetb tberefore still tbat consent (by which I understand the
concurrence of many meo's wills to one action) is not sufficient security for
theircorrmon peace. wilhout the erection ofsome common power, by tbe fear
whereof they may be compeUed both to keep the peace amoog themselves.
and to join their Slreoglhs together. against a common enemy (.E 106).
Here a dual paraUeI caD be seen between the covenant of Hobbes and Sartre's explanation for
tbe oath wbicb the m:nilers ofthe fused group nust take. On one band. this parallel rests on
Same's assertion that:
the unityoftbe fused group lay quite sirq:J1y in real COmtmO action. that is to
say. in its own undertaking 1.5 tmeh as in thai: oftbe enemy. and in the violent,
dangerous. and sometimes fatal anempt to destroy common danger (!.l2&
413).
Eveo though tbe fused group bas a 'common action'. namely, to escape their uofree mode of
being, this goal is oot enough to confinn freedom according 10 Same. as he claims that the
fused group after the passing of an ~ing threat canoot stand on its own. Consequently.
Same states that ~in the absence ofany material pressure. tbe group musl produce il5elfas
Q pressure on irsm~ (CJ2& 430). The group must erect some 'conmoo power'.
Hobbes and Sanre differ greatly 011 the role of the sovereign which keeps the
'corrunon power'. Whereas Hobbes discusses the sovereign as an individual, or group of
iodividuals, who are respoosible for keeping the peace. Sanre maintains that within the
pledged group all individuals art united as 'commoo' individuals with a 'common' project.
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There is noso~ or body of sovert'igns. which controls the plt1:lged group. The point
is tbat Sanre. uolike Hobbes. does DOt see the Deed for an ultimate power (a sovereign).
besides that of tbe oatb itself. to whicb individuals lTWSl submit. BUI Sartre. similarly to
Hobbes. does view the fear ofdeath as playing a crucial role in both motivating individuals
towards a group in fusion and also in maintaining the cohesion ofthe pledged group.
Sarire's conceptions of 'fraternity' and 'feat within the pledged group resemble
Hobbes' notion of 'sufficient security' for tbe 'coomon peace', For instance. Sartre. like
Hobbes. mainuios that tbe pledge oftbe group serves to uoite its menDers towards 'one'
COrIUnOlI action. namely. the goal of sustaioing common praxis. As we have seen in the
previous chapter, commonprtUis must be sustained. as tbe group faces tbe possibility that
the enemy may rerum and. as a result. tbe group rrost be prepared to defend itself against tbe
'COlmlCm eoemy'. But more imponaotty, the pledge. again like Hobbes' covenant. functions
as a fear whicb serves to keep the cohesion oftbe group. Sanre explains:
the fundamental re-creation. within the pledge, is the project of substituting
a real fear, produced by the group itself. for the retreating external fear, whose
very distance is deceptive (COR 4301.
Same., like Hobbes. claims that because it was tbe fear of death wfrich originally enabled tbe
group, it will be the fear ofdeatb that wiU preserve the unity of the group in the future. And
this fear may be either real or fictional
At this point we have seen that the fear of death plays a fundamental role in tbe
philosophies ofhoth Hobbes and Sartre. In the CritiIuu:, it is the fear of death which tears us
away from tbe coercion of the practico-men and gravitates us towards free comrnunised
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pnuis. But is tbe fear of death alone enough? Funher. wbat are the ci:rcwnstaoces which
instigate the fear of dealh?
4.4 The EJemrDts Necessary For A Revolution
Same swes that RiD rrodern society. iD effect. the alienation of the exploited and tbat
ofthe exploiters are ~R(CDR3311.As we saw in chapter two. Sanre. contra Hegel
claims that the exploited (slaves) aod exploiters (masters) are both alienated in the sense tbat
they are both slaves to tbe ~tives (exigencies) oftbc material world (practic:o-inert).
Both master and slave. according to Sanre.. succumb to the coercion of the practico-inerl.
Same claim!; that Hegel failed (0 provide aoy persuasive explanation for why conflicts arise.
as he failed to take into accountlhe historical role of scarcity. Sanre claims:
the antagonistic oegatioo is grasped by everyone as a scandal which has to be
transcended. But at the level ofscarcXy its origiD does not lie in this revelation
of scaodal: il is a $truggle for life .... Consequently tbe scandal is DOt. as
Hegel. supposed. the mere existen~oftbe Other. wbich would take us back
to a 5WUle ofunintelligibility. It lies in sutrered (or threatened) violeDce. that
is. ill interiorised scarcity(CDB 815).
Presumably. Sartre would levy a similar charge against Hobbes. Hobbes. like Hegel.
recognizes the psychological imponaoee anacbed to tbe fear of death. But besides his
explanation lbat humans. by nature. are inclined 10 view the other as a source ofcootlicr'l.
Hobbes fails.. in the~ of Same. to provide any adequate grounding for bow conflicts
~1 Hobbes. inthe~. stales that ·since men by natural passion are divers
ways offensive ODe to another ... !bey rwst oeeds provoke one another ... tiU at last tbey must
determine the pre-cminence by strength and force ofbody'" (£ 78).
92
originally arise. 21 Hobbes. though. does provide a clue to this ground when he explains tbat
conflicts originate when Many twO men desire the same thingM(L 81). Hobbes recognises
scarcity -- a concept lateD! in all the classical comractarians.
As we have seen, according to Same, conflicts between others arise because we dwell
in a material world, a material world where tbere is not enough for everybody. In~
a...Mtth2d. Sartre explains tbat Mexploiter and exploited are men in conflict in a system wbose
principal characteristic is scarciif (SEM 121).23 It is scarcity wbich is the foundation for
human relations. In order to understand conflicts and bow Sartre explains their origin, it is
necessary to return briefly to tbe materialism of Marx and Engels and specifically to their
discussion of the 'division of labour' and how it can be overcome. This is necessary because,
as we sha1I see, Same's explanation for the resurrection offreedom hinges on the combination
ofthe fear ofdeath and specific material clements. At the bean ofSanrc's explanation is the
notion that the fear ofdeath removes us from the everydayness of our present life and enables
us to project a new future.
Marx and Engels., like Sanre, maintain that our relations with both tbe world and with
22 We saw in chapter two tbat Sanre maintains that humans by nature do not have a
'human nature' which fabricates relations among thermelves. This claim rests upon thc
asswnption that because 'existence' precedes 'essencc'. humans arc nothing else except that
which they make tbem'iClves. Therefore, any explanation for relations between humans must
take into account how they have been made and specifically how they have becn made in a
material world.
23 As we can recall, in the glossary, scarcity is defined as Mthe contingent impossibility
of satisfYing all tbe needs ofan ensemble" (CDR 829).
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others are d~eot upon rmteria1 circwnstaDces. Marx and EngeJs.. in regards to history.
explain:
at each stage tbere is fouod a material ~ult: a sum ofproductive forces.. an
historica1ly created relation of indMduals to l1BtW"e and one another. which is
banded down to each geoention from its predecessor. a mass of productive
forces, capital funds and conditions, which, 00 tbe one band. is indeed
modified by the oew generations. but also 00 [he other prescnbes for it its
conditions oflife and gives it a definitive development. a special character (m
59).
From Marx's and Engels' use oftbe term; 'modified' and 'prescribes' we can see bow Same
arrives at tbe realization of "W/OIU des choses - the power ofcircUlIlSWlCeS- <B.EM 33).
Marx and Engels. like Same in tbe Cr:iJ..Uu&c. claim that we find ourselves born in a world
where there is already in place a 'special charaCl.er'. namcly, our relation with tbe material
world which in tum dictates our relations with others. Wbat we will be depends upon tbe
material circwnstances which we are bor-t intO, as it is within tbesc circumstances that we
make ourselves. Marx and Engels claim:
each man has a panicular. exclusive sphere of activity. which is forced upon
him and from wbicb he caooot escape. He is a hunter. a fisherman, a shepherd.
or a critical critic, and roost rema.iD so ifbe does oot want to lose his nans
oflivelibood (GI 53).
In a similar fashion, Same ootes:
to say what mao "is" is also to say what be can be - and vice vena.. The
material conditions nfhis existeoce circumscnbe the field of his possibilities
(his work is too bard. be is too tired to show any interest in union or political
activity.) Thus the field nf possIbles is tbe goal loward which the agent
surpasses his objective situation. And this field in turn depends strictly on the
social, historical reality (SEM 93).
The 'exclusive sphere of activity' is what Marx and Engels tenn the 'division of labour'. This
94
division affects everyone. Just as Same, upon observing twO labourers at work. arrives at the
conclusion that he does not recognize himself or the labourers as humans, but rather he
recognizes himsclfand the labourers via their respective projects, so too do Marx and Engels
maintain that labour influences how we corn;:: to know both olmClves and others. The division
of labour robs everyone, as it circwmcribes to them their funuc projects. Consequently. what
we will be is detcnnined by the social location prescnbed by a specific form of the division
of labour which we are born into; our class being assigns to us material conditions and a
resulting standard of living which is tied to these conditions.
In The Co[JJJJIDjst MQnjfesto, Marx and Engels state that "the history ofall hitheno
existing society is the history ofclass struggle" (CM 488). Marx and Engels, borrowing from
Hegel's conception of master and slave, divide classes within capitalism according to those
who own the instruments ofproduetion and those who do not. Within latter-day history tbe
bourgeoisie plays the domineering social role by constantly changing and revamping the
instruments ofproduction:
the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the
instlUIOOIlts ofproduction, and thereby the relations ofproduction. and with
them the wbole relations of society (CM 491).
The bourgeoisie must constantly revamp tbeir 'instruments of production', as they see
themselves as continually needing to expand: ~the need of a constantly expanding market for
its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe- (CM 492). Changes
to the instruments of production lead to changes within the whole fabric of society, as the
changes directly affect the material reality ofsociety, which in tum dictates new prescriptions
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for- its~ Consequently. the prolewiaJ: are cootTomed with tbe aisis situatioo that the
iotroduction of new instnuneots of production will render them obsolete_ as their 'labour-
power' win be reduced. Marx. with regard to the labour power of an iodividual explaios:
the workman sells his labour-power as a corrmodity. Division of labour
specialises this labour-power. by reducing it to skill in handling a panicular
1001. So SOOIl as the handling orthis tool becomes the work of a machine,
then. with the use·value, the exchaoge-value too. orthe workman's labour-
power vanishes; the workman becomes unsaleable. like paper money thrown
out of currency by legal enactment (C 470).
The prolctariaD worker rears becoming obsolete. because with the continual introduction of
new in.suum:nts ofproductioo. her laboW'-power(bef coamodity) dmnisbes and. as a result.
she faces the future possibilirytbat ber labour will DO klnger have any 'exchange-value' within
the market. As a result. the proletariat live in a climate of -everlasting u.ncenainry'" and
-agitation" (CM 491). But. according to Marx aDd Engels. it is the very lbilily of the divisioll
of labour to breed crises which will eventually result in its revolutionary overturniog.
It is crucial to note tbat the discussion oftbe division of labour in Marx and Engels
pertains directly to the Hegelian cooception of master and slave. Yet nowhere within the
relevant discussions of Marx and EDgels d~ one find any significant mentioo ofdeath. or
specifically the fear of death and the psychological precedence attn"buted to it in Hegel's
fomuJation of master and slave relatioos: bow the fear ofdeath serves as a crucial factor in
both the slave origina.l.ly becoming a slave and the slave eveotuaUy transcending her
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enslavement.2~ This is significant because Sanre, like Hegel desires to explain any
fundamental change to a simation as being perpetuated by a crisis situation which breeds the
fear of death.
In The Geunan Ideology Marx and Engels, with regard to the potential for revolution,
claim:
these conditions of life. which different generations find in existence. decide
also whether or not tbe periodically recurring revolutionary convulsion will be
strong enough 10 ovenhrow tbe basis of an entire system And if these
material elements of a complete revolution are not present (namely. on one
hand the existing productive forces, on the other tbe fonnation of a
revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of
society up till then, but against tbe very "production of life" till then. the "lOtal
activity" on which it is based). then, as far as practical development is
concerned, it is absolutely irrunaterial whether this idea of this revolution has
been expressed a hundred times already. as the history of corrununism proves
(ill 59).
Here we can see that Marx and Engels entertain the notion that individuals can unite in a
conunon cause in order to abolish the previous conditions of alienation and that specific
conditions are necessary for tbis. In Hegelian terms tbis can be explained as the necessity of
the slave breaking free from the master's grasp. Although Marx and Engels mention that a
revolution is contingent upon eertain material elements'. unlike Sartre, they do not explain
revolutionary circumstances in conjunction with tbe fear of death. This is imponant. because
Same implies that tbe fear ofdeath is the road towards freedom It is the fear of death which
H I have come across the mention of starvation leading to death in tbe writings of
Marx and Engels, but nowhere have I found any explicit explanation oftbe fear of death as
a psychological factor along the same lines of Hegel.
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motivates individuals towards actioa against the forces oftbe practico-inen.
4.5 The Fear l)f Death as a Galeway 10 Freedom
As we saw mchapter three. Georges Lefebvre in regards to the 'Great Fear' which led
to the French Revolution. explains tbat "the Great Fear arose from [be fear of the 'brigand'.
whicb can itselfbe explained by the economic. social and political circumstances prevailing
in France in 1189M ([Qf 210). Lefebvre. along the lines of Marx and Engels. implies that tbe
events leadini to tbe French Revolution were the result ofcenaiD "material circumstances".
For instance. Lefebvre octes:
in the spring of 1789. risings caused by famine like conditions were matched
by a series ofrevolts againSt tax-gatberillgs and more panicularly against the
privileged classes.... The prime cause was famine am: 40).
Funher. Lefebvre explains:
tbe pattern of great peasant revohs was established by spring; they were
prectdod by a long period ofsirTmering agitation whicb spread unrest far and
wide CTIlE 46).
We can see bow tbe circumstances for a revolutioo in the France of 1789 were ripe. as tbe
peasants Wert living UDde!'" a stale of'unc:ertainty' and 'agitatioo' because under conditions of
famine. they were literally anxious about wbert their next meal would come from. In 1m:
Pam gfYiolmccr Revohnjog in the Modem Work!.. Cart Leiden and Karl M. Scbmin note:
because violence seerm so often to be connected witb revolution. we lend to
transfer its transient character to revolutioD itself. We are impressed by the
sudden. orgiastic nature ofvioleoce and conclude that revolution bas tbe same
nature (B.MYl4).
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Same. as we can see. would agree that vio1eDce is not simply an annbute of a revolution. but
rather it is the prime cause for Ihe birth of a revolution, But here we must be careful about
what we nan by violeoce. For instance.. Same maintains that the individual of scarcity lives
in a climate of'vW::lIeoce', as scarcity "as a mona! danger. produces everyone in a multiplicity
as a mona! danger forme Other" (CDR 735). In a climale of scarcity. the individual commits
acts of violence against her reuow humans. as tbe satisfaction of her needs dirc:cl:1y imperils
the otber. The individual according to Same. will exist docilely in this euviroarnent. untIl
circumstances become so great. lhat her life is in rronal danger. II is not until circumstances
violently Ihreaten!he lives ofindividuals that they will make a move towards freedom Same.
in regards to the genesis of the group. explains:
the transformation therefore occurs wben ~SSlbility itself becomes
~ble. or wbeo a synthetic event reveals that Ihe in1>ossibility of change
is an impossibility of life. The direct result of this is to make the impossibility
ofchange the vel)' object which has to be transcended if life is 10 conlinue
(=350).
The indivW:lual will DOt be awoken from her practico-men nightmare until the forces oftbe
praetico-inen violently threaten her very life.
At this point we can see Same's reasons for how individuals will escape Ihe coerced
life of the practico-incrt world. Prior to the appearance ofa group in fusion Sanre maintains
that we live in a relatively unfree world. The reason for this coetcioo. is derived from our
original need. Same states:
free praxis may directly destroy the freedom of the Other. or place it in
parentheses (mystification. stratagem) through lhe material instrument (CQ&
736).
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When we aa upon our original needs we freely do 50 in the context of sbariDg • world with
otbers. Our first reaction is 001 to coopeme wtb the other. but rather to see her as an enemy.
as sbc is a rrortal danger to us. She has the same oeeds that we bave in order to survive. and.
therefore, she is in competition with us in a scarce world. As a result we struClure a world
which is based upon implicit and explicit social antagonisms. And these antagonisms become
so deeply embedded in our social psyche that they can only be overcome by the fear ofdeath.
4.6 Htidean andA~
In chapter three we saw bow Same's conception of massification resembles
Heidegger's explanation of the 'tbey'. Both massification and the tbey penain to tbe notion
that we find ourselves outwardly absorbed in the everydayness of life, as we become
dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted un 264). Heidegger explains Dascin's
absorption into tbe 'tbey' as a S1ale of faUen·ness:
tbis ~absorptioo in ... ~ (Aufgebeo bei ... Jhas mostly the character of Being.
lost in the publicness of [be "tbey~. Dascin has for instance. fallen away
[abge&UenJ from itselfas an autheotic potentiality for Being its Self. and bas
faDen into the world'(220).
According to Heidcgger. as Ioog as Oasein rc:nains ab50rbed in the everydayness of the 'they'.
sbe cannot live up to bel" 'authentic potentiality', as she takes ber exislentiell cues from tbe
crowd and oat berself
Heideggers existetJtial predecessor, Sereo Kierkegaard, recogoized tbis phenomenon
and explained it as a levelling process~ ~tbe levelling process is oot the aClion of the
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individual, but the work of reflection in the hands of an abstract power" CTITP' 261). The
'abstract power' according to Kierkcgaard is thc public. And it is from the public that the
individual seeks truth. As a result, the decisions of the individual are made by the public. as
this is where the individual goes to seek truth. In tbis situation society is not dominated by
individuals, but rather individuals are dominated by society, as tbey 'do' and 'say' what those
in society 'do' and 'say'.
Hcidcgger explains that even though Dascin may be lost and fallen in the everydayness
of the 'they', she can still interpret the world from an individual point of view. Heidegger
explains:
in falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in world is the issue,
even ifin the mode of inauthenticity. Dasein can fall only because Being-in-
the-world Wldemandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. On the other
hand authentic existence is not something which floats above falling
everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such
everydayness is seized UpoD (ili 224).
Dascin has the ability to recognize that although she does exist in a fallen, inauthentic state,
she still has the potential for existing in an authentic mode ofbcing.
We have already noted how Heidegger explains Dasein's inauthentic mode of being
as "a fleeing in the face of itself' (BI 229). Dascin flees from herself. because she takes
refuge in the banality of the 'they'. AJthough Dasein takes eomfon in the everydayness of the
world, Heidegger claims that there exists a specific mood in which Dasein can escape from
the refuge of the 'they' and move towards an authentic life:
anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being to'wards its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being -- that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and
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taking boklofilsel( A:lWctybrings Dasc:in face: to lace with its&ing.jreefor
(propensio in ...J the authenticity of its Semg, and this authenticity as a
possibility which it always is (III 232).
Anxiety. as opposed to fear. reveals to Dasein that what she is a.mcious about is oo-thing.
Unlike fear. in anxiety there is no specific region or object which is fearwme: we are oot
f~ of any entity in the world. Rather, anxiety discloses 10 us "that entities in the world
are nOI 'relevant' at all" cBI 231). In anxiety Dasein realizes that tbe world which she
encounters in her everyday existence is foreign and alien to her. as she recognizes the
mistaken meaning which she has anached to its entities.
Heidegger explains that the fOOl ofanxiety is Da.scin's fear offalling towards death.
Heidegger rmi:mains that ODCe Dasein acceptS the possibility ofber death she wiIJ be able to
move beyond the 'they' and towards an authentic eltistence. Heidegger claims that "death is
Dasein's OWlmoJ1 possibility" cllr 307). Because death is specific to 'me' it wrests me away
from the superficiality of'the they' and towards the authentic possibilities of ,my' being. As
opposed to Reeing 'myself. I confront 'myself.
Between Heidegger and Sanre.. circa Being and Ngrbingnesi, there exists a vast
difference in opinion on what exaaly 'froedom' is. This differeocc: resides in Sartre explaining
freedom in terms of choices or alternatives while Heidegger explains freedom in tenm of
autbeoticity. Sartre, in Being and Npthjnpne$-'b maintains that nothing except the individual
herselfcan binder what she will be in tbe future. Heidegger, On tbe other hand. claims that the
individual is always free in the sense lhat she can escape from tbe banality oftbe 'they' and
lead an authentic life.
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We can sec that Sanre in tbe Cril..iwJ.t:. in a similar vein to Heidegger in~
I.i.rlli::, maintains that the confrontation with tbe possibility of death can lead to a more
authentic existence. Sanre explains this authentic existence in tenns of the emergence of
freedom within the fused and pledged groups. Sanre maintains that when a ccnain segment
of individuals are threatened with annihilation. they will break free of the previous bonds of
their inauthentic ~fe and roove towards an authentic life. They will break free from the inertia
ofthc praetico-inen. But Sanrc, unlike Heidegger, does not explain the fear of death in tenrn
ofan anxiety about nothing in the world. Rather, the fear of death is explained in conjunction
with rca~ objective material forces. In the~ it is not the individual who confronts the
fear of death. Rather tbe fear of death confronts the individual.
4.7 Conclusion
In the Cri.l.iQ.u..e Sanre transfers Heidegger's notion of death from an individual level
to a group leveL This transfer corresponds with Sanre agreeing with Hobbes that in order for
individuals to escape a previous life and in order for a group to function and maintain its
cohesion. its rrernbcrs must be motivated by tbe fear ofdeath. Why is fear so imponant for
the group? Fear is of crucial imponance because when we originally negate our world in
order to satisfy our needs we do so out of fear. It is the role which fear plays that
distinguishes Sanre's historical materialism from that of Marx and Engels. In Sartre's view
we desire to change the world which crushes us (CI!& 112). According to Sanre. we are
beings who are born out of fear. as our original binh in the world corresponds with the
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possibility that our lives will be changed from without. We realize that we must borrow from
the material world in order to survive. Funher. we also recognize that we are in competition
with others for swvival. Sanre attaches great imponance to the specific fear of death. because
as he sees it. the fear of death is what can inspire changes to the world. as it can bring
individuals together. The fear of death is what makes us seek out social order. as described
by Hobbes. FUl1her. when the fear ofdeath brings individuals together. this fear must be kept
alive. as it will compel individuals to see themselves and others as humans.
As we have seen., Sanre maintains that it is scarcity which is the basis for antagonistic
relations among hwnans. According to Sanre. scarcity is responsible for both the implicit and
explicit acts of violence which we perform against one another throughout history and up
until the prescnt day. Can scarcity historically explain the millions of deaths resulting directly
from the hands of other humans? Can it provide a rationale for the twelltieth-century. a
century that has witnessed two world wars and nurr.crous other wars of conflict? Can scarcity
explain the prescllce of world poverty and its striking presence in countries which are
described as 'industrialised'?
William McBride, in regards to the~. asks: "What has happened. in this
analysis. to human freedom?~ (ill 148). McBride responds:
in tbe Cn'tique he [Sanre] has not repudiated either his earlier view that to be
hwnan is to be free, or his corrurutment to human liberation as a supreme and
open-ended goal. What has altered greatly is his awareness, now vastly
increased oftbe innumerable ways in which the dialectic of human freedom in
the worlds of society, politics. and history in which we all exist constantly
results in freedom's contravening itself in its very efforts at expression (Sf!
149).
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In the CJ:iliQue we see Sanre walk a fine line between freedom and detenninism On one band.
Sanre maintains that we are 'free' in the sense that we always project ourselves into the
future. But, as SanTe argues in the~, our projections occur within limits so defined
that our future is 'destinized' We are born into social situations which are not of our own
choosing and on the roost part we tTUlSt make ourselves out of these situations. The only way
to escape this desriny is., under the threat ofdeath. for the individual to join forces with others.
But the group in fusion and its subsequent sister, the pledged group. are themselves
dependent upon destiny, as they cannot corne into being until circumstances threaten the life
ofa collective of people.
tn the~ forever gone is the absolute freedom which Sanre ascribed to the
individual in Being and Nothingness. Sanre. equipped with a modified Marxism setS out in
the~ to see how 'circumstances' can modify our freedom What he discovers is that
freedom as envisaged by him, has been modified for the better pan of history. In the CritiQ..ue:
Sanre only provides us with glimpses of freedom Freedom has been on the short end of
coercion throughout hislory. Funher. there is no utopic vision of a society in the near future
where freedom will reign. Why? It appears that Sanre maintains that individuals will always
be individuals. And in a world of scarcity it seems nearly impossible for individuality to be
transferred all to a group. As a result, freedom itself appears to be a near impossible
achievemem.
tn conclusion a passage from one ofSanre's last interviews is worth quoting. Sartre,
when asked about hope for the future, replies:
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what with the thin! world war that can break out any day. and [be Wretched
mess our plaoet bas become. despair bas come back to teql[ me with the idea
[hat there is DO end a[ all that: there is DO goaL that tbere are only small.
indMdual ob;ectives that we figI:r: for. We make small revolulions. but there's
no human end. there's DOthing of coocem to human beings. there's only
disorder. A person can think sormhing like this. It terqKS you constantly.
especiaflywbenyou're old and think.. ·WelL anyhow. ('mgoing to die in five
years at tbeoutsidc~ - aetuaIly.l'mthinking ilterms often yeatS. but iI: could
weD be five. In any event. the worid seems ugly, evil aDd bopeless. Such is the
calm despair of an old man who wiD die in despair. But the point is. I'm
resisting. and ( kD<lw that I sba.II die in hope. Bu[ this hope musr: be grounded.
We rmst try to explain why the world ofloday, which is homble. is only one
tromeo[ in a long historical development. that hope has always been one of
lbe domnam forces of revolutions and insurrections, and how I still feel thai
hope is my conception oftbe future (IDf 110).
Odd unerances from a man who once wrote lhat "whalever the circumstances. and whatever
tbe site, man is always free 10 choose 10 be a traitor or nOI" (Bf.M 34). Perhaps oo! SO odd
when taken in the context of the historical circwnstances which Ihe~ descn'bes.
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